Economic reconstruction policy in the Netherlands and its international consequences, May 1945-March 1951 by GRIFFITHS, Richard T.
EUROPEAN UNIVERSITY INSTITUTE, FLORENCE 
DEPARTMENT OF HISTORY AND CIVILIZATION
"Challenge and Response in Western 
Europe: the Origins of the European 
Community (1945 - 1950)"
Project directed by Professor Alan Milward
Project Paper No. 1
E U I W O R K I N G  P A P E R  No.76
ECONOMIC RECONSTRUCTION POLICY IN 
THE NETHERLANDS AND ITS INTERNATIONAL 



































































































This paper should not be reproduced in whole or 
in part without the prior permisssion of the author.
Paper presented in the conference held on 
17 and 18 November 1983 entitled
"National and International Economic Recon­
struction in Western Europe,1945-1950"
(C) Richard T. Griffiths 1984 
Printed in Italy in January 1984 
European University Institute 
Badia Fiesolana 










































































































Introduction: Defining the title
The Dutch Economy in May 1945 
The Goals of Reconstruction Policy
Reconstruction Policy and Foreign Exchange Availability
The Achievements of Reconstruction Policy
The Need to Reorient Foreign Economic Policy
The Netherlands and the Economic Integration of Europe
Conclusions
























































































































































































INTRODUCTION: DEFINING THE TITLE*
The aim of this paper is to examine the nature of Dutch reconstruction 
policy in the years following the end of World War II and to investigate 
the links between domestic reconstruction policy and the foreign economic 
policy of the Netherlands. Because, to date, very little research has 
been conducted into government archival sources, this paper became 
much longer than was originally intended or even desired. Even so it 
does not claim to provide a complete picture of developments even within 
the self-imposed restrictions in the aspects covered.
The term economic reconstruction has been restricted to cover those 
measures aimed at restoring the physical productive capacity of the 
economy. Within this process two distinct stages can be discerned - 
a recovery stage and a restructuring stage. The recovery stage, in turn, 
comprised two separate elements. At its simplest level recovery policy 
was essentially a re-stocking exercise aimed at reactivating existing 
economic capacity by restoring the flow of energy, raw materials and 
semi-manufactured goods into the productive process. The second, and 
more difficult process was the one of rebuilding and replacing capital 
stocks damaged, destroyed or looted during the War itself as well as 
making up the back-log of replacement investment which had arisen as 
a result of the unmatched capital depreciation in the five war-years 
and the immediate post-war year. Thus the recovery stage as a whole in­
volved bringing the economy back to its pre-war level in aggregate terms. 
But recovery, by itself, would be insufficient to resolve the problems 
which arose as a result of structural changes which had occurred both 
inside and outside the Dutch economy in the intervening years. These 
changes were discerned by Dutch policy-makers as three-fold in nature - 
the need to maintain the competitiveness of the economy by catching-up 
on the technological advances made elsewhere, the need to create work 
opportunities for the increase in the potential labour-force as a result 
of the high pre-war birth rate arid the need to improve the balance of 
trade to compensate for the anticipated decline in net invisible earnings 
and to be able to service and repay foreign loans. This second stage 
we will term 'restructuring', though in the minds of contemporary 
policy-makers it was virtually synonymous with the narrower term 
'industrialisation'. The narrow definition of the term economic recon­




























































































measures to restore the material wealth of the population, particularly 
in the area of housing, as well as a consideration of macro-economic 
policy in general including such areas as wages-policy and currency reform 
where policy measures undoubtedly contributed to the economic reconstruc­
tion as here defined (for these areas, as well as for general economic 
histories of the period, the reader is invited to refer to the 
bibliography).
The term policy is also defined in a restricted sense and refers mainly 
to policy as made within cabinet. It deliberately excludes an analysis 
of the manifold pressures from quasi-governmental bodies, parliamentary 
parties and extra-parliamentary pressure groups which may well have 
influenced the behaviour of ministers within cabinet but to have included 
such considerations would have extended the scale of this study out of 
all proportion. More regretfully, the narrow definition also excludes 
an analysis of the policy-formation process within and between the 
ministeries themselves but the time available for the preparation of this 
paper did not permit the extensive archival research which such an under­
taking would have required.
The term international consequences is a complete misnomer. It is true, 
for example, that insofar that foreign loans and the liquidation of 
foreign assets were necessary to finance the reconstruction policy it 
weakened the invisibles side of the balance of payments and may thus 
marginally have contributed to a measure of increased stridency in inter­
national negotiations on trade liberalisation and tariff reductions but 
it would be an exaggeration to attach too much importance to such consi­
derations. More significant in this respect were the structure of the 
domestic economy, the structure of its protectionist instruments, parti­
cularly after the Benelux tariff union in January 1948, and the changes 
in the structure of post-war trading relationships, particularly with 
respect to the United States and Germany. What this paper has attempted 
in this section is an analysis of foreign policy towards Western Europe 
- a geographical restriction in its terms of references which I hope will 
not diminish its usefulness in the research project of which it forms 
a part. The results of this analysis will demonstrate in a negative way 
the distinct lack of any links between domestic reconstruction policy and 
foreign economic policy; a finding which does little for the coherence 





























































































Finally the period covered by this paper can only partly be considered 
to form a cohesive whole. May 1945 is an obvious starting point since it 
was the date at which the Netherlands was finally liberated. Even so 
it must be recognised that the territory South of the great rivers of 
the Maas, the Waal and the Rhine had already fallen into Allied hands 
in September 1944 though its proximity to the front line and the lack 
of transportation for anything but the basic necessities means that its 
administration belongs more properly to the history of the war economy^. 
The choice of March 1951 is more difficult to justify but there were two 
reasons for its selection. Firstly, in terms of reconstruction policy, 
it marked the announcement of a package of deflationary measures to curb 
the growing balance-of-payments deficit which finally subjugated the 
need to finance reconstruction policy to the dictates of macro-economic 
management. Secondly, in terms of foreign policy, it represents the 
final agreement on the terms of the Treaty of Paris, signed the following 
month, establishing the European Coal and Steel Community. The logic 
of both is purely arbitrary, but one must end somewhere. Yet March 1951 
does leave a number of loose ends. In terms of reconstruction policy, 
the goal of balance-of-payments equilibrium was not achieved until the 
second half of 1951 and pre-war levels of productivity were not attained 
until 1952. Either of these achievements could have been chosen as re­
presenting the end of the 'reconstruction' stage. Equally in foreign 
economic policy March 1951 saw Dutch goals in the area of tariff reduc­
tions as far from solution as ever and the discussion of this issue in 
this paper is left hanging unresolved - a situation as unsatisfactory for 
the government at the time as it well undoubtedly be for the reader.
THE DUTCH ECONOMY IN MAY 1945
There is no doubt that the Dutch economy had suffered greatly at the 
hands of the Germans during the War. As a result, in May 1945, much 
productive capacity had been looted or destroyed and levels of current 
output had been much reduced. Since the policy-makers' perspectives 
of the tasks of recovery and reconstruction respectively depended on an 
accurate assessment of losses on both counts, it is necessary to examine 
exactly how accurate that assessment actually was. This section will 
argue that the picture drawn immediately after the war was over-pessimistic 




























































































As far as the current output by industry is concerned, the picture was
probably fairly reliable. By 1944 the index of manufacturing output had
fallen to 32.4 percent of its 1938 level and in 1945 the figure can be
2 )put, rather more speculatively, at 24.8 percent. The accuracy of both
estimates is lent some credence by the figure of 38 percent for the
3)third quarter of 1945 . There is also broad agreement on the losses
incurred in the level of industrial stocks. These had stood at f 1000
million in September 1939 (valued at 1938 prices - as are all subsequent
figures unless otherwise stated) and immediately after the War the Central
. 4)Bureau of Statistics estimated the losses at f 850 million . This 
figure seems rather more likely than other estimates that the level of 
stocks had been reduced to nothing^. Also it should be noted that 
because of the War emergency, the level of stocks was unusually high and 
that not all these losses needed to be replaced to restore the pre-war 
level of activity. Where the problem arises is in the crverestimation of 
the losses to physical capital. The original CBS estimate was that of 
the fixed capital assets worth / 4000 million in September 1939 / 210 
million was lost through war damage, / 450 million through disinvestment 
and a further f 450 million through the German dismanteling of plant 
in the last year of the War - a loss of 28 percent^. By the beginning 
of 1947 these figures had been revised downwards. Firstly the figure 
for machinery looted by the Germans was reduced to / 250 million; a 
reestimation which did not take into account f 60 million traced and
7)recovered by that date and secondly the figure for war damage was
o)
reduced to f 56 million - reducing the total loss to 18.9 percent. In
1948 the figure for the percentage loss had been cut still further to
18 percent though the figure for fixed capital had been revised upwards
to / 5000 million and, since this entailed an upward revision of the
. 9)depreciation figure, that for losses to f 900 million
In agriculture the difficulty is estimating levels of output lay in the 
acquisition of reliable data. The official index for 1945 (1938=100) 
was 31 for animal farming, 68 for arable farming and 70 for market 
gardening^^ but estimates for the last two seem improbably low consi­
dering that a year later the index stood at 113 and 118 respectively^.
In terms of capital losses the greatest damage was inflicted on animal 
stocks. There were originally estimated at / 250 million out of a total 
f 500 million or 50 percent. The original estimate of damage to land 




























































































/ 450 million which needs to be set against assets worth / 3000 million
12)- 15 percent. These figures were almost immediately raised to / 575
13)and f 3300 millions respectively - 17.7 percent . The totals of losses
of / 250 million to animal stocks and / 575 million elsewhere have never
been altered but what had been reassessed by 1948 was the valuation of
the original assets which were now put at f 700 million for animal stocks
and / 5100 million for land, buildings, machinery etc. This had the
effect of reducing the percentage losses to 35.8 and 11.7 percent respec- 
14)tively . It should also be noted that in the case of the flooded land 
it did not require investment, in the sense of capital outlay, equivalent 
to the value of assets 'lost' to bring it back into production nor even 
investment of that order in the sense of foregone consumption^^.
The greatest damage suffered was by the transport sector. The first post­
war estimate placed the value of losses to railways, trams, lorries, 
shipping etc. at f 827 million out of a total capital value of f 1500 
million - 55 percent^. Soon afterwards the damage estimate was raised
to / 1005 million - 60.6 percent'^, a figure which the upward revaluation
18)of both existing assets and war losses in 1948 failed to alter . These 
figures all exclude damage to harbour installations, warehouses and 
other storage facilities which are buried in the general catagories of 
'trade1 (which also includes shops, hotels, cafe's etc.) and 'govern­
ment property'. In the case of harbour works and installations, losses
19)amounted to f 300 million
A summary statement of the total extent of losses to physical assets, 
including those in the consumption sector, as estimated in 1948,is pro­




























































































Table One; Losses in Physical Capital Assets in the Netherlands as a
Result of World War II
Value of Assets Decline in Value of
in September 1939 Assets by May 1945
Agriculture 5800 825
Industry 6000 17501 )
Transport 1700 1030
Trade (incl. hotels, 2500 1800
cafe's etc.)
of which buildings 1000 400
stocks 1500 1400 '
Banks, Credit, Insurance 300 15
Government Property 2800 550
(excl. business property)
Churches, private hospitals 500 150
+ schools, cinemas etc.
Inventories held by 50 10
professions
Houses 5000 650
Furnishings and 5000 1200
consumer durables
29650 7980
1) This figure includes stock losses of / 850 million rather than / 1000 
million cited by the source (see Text)
2) More so than in the case of industry, levels of trading stocks were 
exceptionally high before the War.
Source: A.R.A., Kabinet (112) 351.88(73):33(1) Eerste verslag van de
Nederlandse Regering aangaande de werking van het Europees 
Herstel Programma: behandelende de période April tot en met 
September 1948.
Before turning to examine reconstruction policy proper, it is necessary
to say a brief word about the domestic financial consequences of the war
itself. As a consequence of the expenditure of both the government and
20)the German occuppying authorities the note issue had expanded from
/ 1166 million in April 1940 to / 5517 million by April 1945 whilst
liquid assets held by banks had grown from f 1480 million to f 5014
21)million over the same period . Bearing in mind that between those two
dates the volume of production had fallen sharply (by 1944 by as much




























































































. . .  . 23)cost-of-living index had risen by about 30 percent as a result of the
stringent war-time price controls, the danger of rampant inflation was 
all too obviously present. The problem of monetary instability, which 
was to bedevil the recovery programmes of so many European countries, 
was averted by a package of measures announced by the Minister of Finance,
P. Lieftinc^^ , in September 1945. In the first place all existing bank­
notes lost their status as legal tenure but could be deposited in blocked 
accounts with the commercial banks. At the same time all existing banks 
deposits were similarly 'blocked'. Money was then reintroduced into the 
economy through the payment of wages and the gradual 'deblocking' of 
bank accounts for various priority usages whilst the State further reduced
the available liquidity through special taxation and the issue of govern-
25)ment securities (both of which could be paid from the blocked accounts) 
Although inflationary pressures were to re-emerge they were a function 
of the governments subsequent fiscal and monetary policy and were relatively 
mild compared with the scale of the disaster which threatened to overtake 
the Netherlands in the absence of the September '45 measures.
THE GOALS OF RECONSTRUCTION POLICY
Immediately after the War the perspectives of policy-makers scarcely 
ventured beyond the daunting task of repairing the damage and deprecia­
tion of the war years themselves. Within months to first 
inventory of post-war investment needs had been prepared 
by the Central Bureau of Statistics. It estimated total cival 
investment for these ends alone at 1945 prices at / 9705 million distri­
buted globally as follows (in million guilders): industry / 2650, trans­
port / 1590, trade f 1580, agriculture f 1300 with buildings and consumer 
durables taking up most of the rest. In addition it was calculated that 
it would require / 500 million per annum simply to keep the productive 
capacity which had survived the war intact. In order to finance this 
it was estimated that as long as national income stood at 80 percent of 
its 1938 level and consumption held to a 'basic minimum' enterprises 
could be expected to generate savings of / 500 - /1000 millions p.a. and 
savings elsewhere could amount to / 400 million p.a. After confronting 
the two sides of the equation with each other and making some assumption 
on the availability of foreign loans and the liquidation of foreign 
assets, the report concluded that it would take five years before recovery 





























































































It was not until the beginning of 1946 that the next assessment appeared 
in the form of a 'National Welfare Plan' prepared by the Central Plan- 
bureau (henceforth CPB)• The Plan needs to be seen as a mixture of 
forecasts and policy prescriptions which, moreover, were bound up with 
assumptions over the growth of the economy, the availability of foreign 
credits and the performance of imports and exports. The details of the 
investment programme are given in Table Two. It should be noted that 
these figures are not directly comparable with those of the Central 
Bureau of Statistics since the 'building' component of investment in 
industry, agriculture and transport in shown separately and is not 
broken down by sector.
Table Two: Investment Requirements to Ensure the 'Recovery' of
Dutch Productive Capacity (estimated February 1946) 
million guilders, 1946 prices
1946 1947 1948 1949
Construction 170 800 1200 Recovery complete
Transport 390 400 150 150
Industry and 
Agriculture
900 650 600 Recovery complete




620 620 620 620
Source: Min. EZ, DG Handel en Nijverheid, 2164/1 Eerste Nota over het
Nationaal Welvaartsplan 1946, CPB, February 1946.
Working on the assumption that the level of consumption of single-use 
consumer goods would only gradually recover their 1938 levels by 1950, 
the Plan concluded 'that the recovery period for the metal industry will 
be shorter than one year, for other industries, the transport apparatus 
and agriculture 3 years, for consumer durable-goods 4 to 5 years whilst
27)the recovery period for construction objects will probably be 10 years'
By August 1946 the CPB was forced to recognise that even this dismal 
prognosis had been over-optimistic since recovery in the levels of economic 



























































































longer than was originally estimated ... There can be no talk of a
strong recovery or expansion of the production apparatus ... Reconstruc-
28')tion will commence at full steam for the first time in 1947' • A month
later a new set of medium-term forecasts/prescriptions were ready in the 
form of the first version of a Central Economic Plan for the year 1947 
which included a medium-term 'framework' covering the period to 1952.
The new plan differed in conception from the previous two. Instead of 
predicting the length of the recovery period on the basis of assumptions 
about the performance of the economy as a whole, it started with targets 
for the attainment of recovery and then worked backwards to see what 
would be necessary to attain them. Moreover, the concept of 'recovery' 
used also incorporated a measure we defined earlier as 'restructuring' 
in the sense that the aims now included a recognition of the needs of 
the increased population/work force. The first aim was the attainment 
of pre-war levels of labour productivity•by mid-1950 (also the year 
when it was anticipated that industrial output would regain its 1938 
level) Whilst the second, inspired by the need to guarantee 'full 
employment', was to restore productive capital stocks to their pre-war 
level in per capita terms by 1952 (i.e. to increase productive capital 
stocks by 13 percent compared with 1938). The investment needs to 
achieve these aims are presented in Tabel Three.
Table Three Investment Requirements to Achieve the 'Recovery'
of the 'Framework' Plan (estimated September 1946) 
million guilders, estimated 1947 prices
New Investment 1946 1947 1948 1949 1950 1951 1952
Industry 200 600 700 700 700 600 600
Agriculture 100 200 200 200 200 200 200
Trade - - 100 100 100 200 100
Transport 400 500 400 400 300 400 400
Stocks 300 300 200 200 200 100 100
1000 1600 1600 1600 1500 1400 1400
Replacement Inv. 700 700 900 900 900 1000 1100
Source: Min. EZ, DG Handel en Nijverheid, 2164/1 Centraal Economisch Plan




























































































The sacrifice which this would require from the population was that per 
capita consumption would still be 6 percent below the 1938 level by 1952
whilst the completion of the civil construction programme had been
291pushed back to 1960
By March 1947 when the next survey is available a noticeable change in 
perspective had taken place and the trend of increasing pessimism which 
characterised the plans almost since the end of the War was finally re­
versed. Two factors had contributed to this change in mood. In the first 
place the economy had performed less badly in 1946 than the CPB, as late 
as August-September, had predicted it would - manufacturing industry 
bettered the predicted level by 15 percent, agriculture by 4.8 percent, 
shipping by 3.4 percent, other transport by 33.3 percent. The greatest 
'failure' in the opposite direction was the construction industry, which 
undershot its target by 20 percent but even so 'total domestic physical 
production by enterprises' was 5.3 percent higher than predicted. Not 
only were the figures for current output higher than predicted but so 
too were those for productive investment. The sums invested in machinery 
and equipment in industry, trade, transport, agriculture and communications 
were / 725 million as opposed to / 620 million predicted and the corre­
sponding figures for stocks were f 500 million and f 340 million res-
30)pectively . The second reason for the change was the reassessment of
the actual industrial capital losses incurred during the War. Expressed
as a percentage of capital assets in 1939, the estimate for losses had
been revised downwards from 28 percent to 18.9 percent and could be
lowered further to 17.4 precent if machinery returned from Germany
were taken into account (see p. 4). In its loan application to the Inter- 
1national Bank for Reconstruction and Development (henceforth Interbank 
Nota I) the government revised its projected completion data for 'recovery' 
to 1949. It also introduced a new 'restructuring' dimension into its 
reasoning in the form of a new accent placed on the balance of payments.
It was argued that the old pre-war equilibrium was unattainable because 
of the damage to the economy of the Dutch East Indies, the reduction in 
the foreign investment portfolio, the reduction in invisible earnings 
from Germany and the need to service reconstruction loans. 'The Nether­
lands must reduce imports, increase exports and raise production to 
make ends meet; this is only possible through a far-reaching industria­
lisation. ' The details of the investment programma envisaged by Interbank
31)Nota I have been incorporated in Table Four (see p.13) - A  considerable 



























































































more particularly, future estimates. In terms of backward comparison 
the Interbank Nota I estimate for 'recovery' investment in industry is 
/ 800 million (at 1946 prices) which is considerably lower than the 
CPB 'net investment' figure over the same three years of / 1900 million 
(at estimated 1947 prices). Not all of this difference is accounted 
for by the reassessments made in Interbank Nota I - part is attributable 
to the differences in the price base used and part to the fact that the 
CPB figure may include an element of investment designed to raise the 
volume of capital assets above the 1938 level. More important are the 
qualifications needed when comparing the 'new' industrial investment 
plans with subsequent plans. Whereas the subsequent plans incorporate an 
element of prediction/target, the figures in Interbank Nota I refer only 
to investment plans already registered with the authorities. Moreover 
that registration only included investment plans for which foreign 
exchange cover had not already been granted at the time of submitting the 
report. The figures exclude, therefore, investment plans for which a 
foreign exchange allocation had been made but which had not yet been 
executed as well as investment plans which were able to cover their own 
foreign exchange needs (which might explain, for example, why the oil 
industry does not appear in the totals at all).
In January 1948 the government was once again knocking on the doors of 
the International Bank; not the most auspicious occasion for launching 
the first truely 'restructuring' plan in Dutch history (henceforth 
Interbank Nota II). 'Recovery' was firmly pushed into the background which 
was not really surprising since the index of industrial production had 
surged past its pre-war level already in the last quarter of 1947 (some­
thing which fifteen months earlier had not been predicted for another
32)three years!) . The actual programme was preceded by an analysis of the
likely balance of payments deficit in 1952 (based, not very scientifically,
33)on an extrapolation from 1938) and the investment required to close it 
Working on the assumptions i) that per capita consumption had regained 
its pre-war levels ii) that labour productivity was 10 percent above its 
pre-war level and iii) taking into account the structural changes in 
German and Indonesian trade and the deterioration of net invisible earnings, 
it estimated a current account deficit of f 1800 million (all figures at 
1947 prices). Since relatively little help was to be expected from agri­
culture or shipping, this gap could only be closed by raising industrial 
production by / 2600 million which could require an investment of the 




























































































investment programme, details of which are given in Table Four. Although 
the figure for 'new' industrial investment contained in the programme is 
similar to that in the 'idealised' calculation its composition was 
different. Firstly the actual programme included electricity investment 
(which needed to be added to the 'idealised' version) and secondly it 
included a greater concentration on 'basic' industries which had a low 
foreign-exchange saving effect until the forward linkage effects 
actually materialised. «
As a result the programme still left a deficit of f 900 million in 1952, 
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The two Interbank Notas were essentially internal government documents and
34)it was not until September 1949 that van den Brink unveiled to a largely 
unprepared parliament and public the scale of government thinking. Whereas 
Interbank Nota II had failed to predict a current account equilibrium, 
with virtually the same amount of 'new' industrial investment, van den 
Brink's Industrialisatie Nota I did actually manage the feat as well as 
at the same time promising to create the 120.000 extra industrial employ­
ment places necessary to guarantee full employment. The Nota itself was
35)couched largely in general terms but members of parliament were later 
given confidential access to the detailed statistical foundation of the
o/: \
programme , details of which are provided in Table Four. The balance
of payments analysis was based on an extrapolation of the 1948 data after
taking account of changes in the terms of trade, consumption increases
and debt service. It anticipated a deficit in 1952 of f 2800 millions
(all figures at 1948 prices). Unlike Interbank Nota II which assigned
little role to the agricultural and service sectors, Industrialisatie
Nota I allotted these sectors the task of increasing foreign exchange
earnings by / 800 and / 500 millions respectively. In order to close the
remaining gap net industrial production would have to be raised by
/ 1700 million by 1952 - / 900 million to be achieved by increases in
labour productivity and / 800 by means of the investment programme
envisaged. The fact that the investment programme itself had a smaller
foreign-exchange-savings role than that envisaged by the Interbank Nota II
(where the increase in productivity had already been discounted in the
original balance of payments calculation) meant that Industrialisatie
Nota I was able to accentuate the stress on 'basic' industries even
further but this stress was sharply reduced when Industrialisatie Nota II
31)was published a year later . The only explanation was that the alteration 
was due to 'the basis of experience to date', which had shown a more rapid 
than anticipated increase in the rest of industry, and 'revisions which 
appeared necessary'. The changes in the totals in Table Four were 
occassioned by an upward estimation of the labour force and of the trade 
gap which meant that the net industrial production target was increased 
and with it the 'new' investment required whilst at the same time the 




























































































We can summarise the developments described above in the following way. 
Until September 1946 the aims of reconstruction policy were largely 
confined to the needs of economic recovery. In March 1947 this focus 
became diluted for the first time and from January 1948 onwards govern­
ment programmes were directed towards targets of restructuring the 
economy primarily in the direction of industrialisation. However, it must 
by stressed that these programmes were a mixture of prediction and pres­
cription and that talk of a reconstruction 'policy' in the sense of a cen­
trally guided, interlocking set of complementary measures guided to rea­
lise reconstruction goals, is entirely misplaced.
The 'plan socialism' ideas of the first post-war minister of Trade and
o g \
Industry, H. Vos in the areas of central planning and partnership
between government, employees and employers were abandoned with the
39)nomination of his catholic party successor, G.W.M. Huijsmans who
also purged the upper ranks of his Ministry of Vos' socialist appointees.
Far from the government 'leading' reconstruction, he was concerned that
government interference in the economy be brought back to more normal 
. 40)proportions . The role of the Government was spelt out in Interbank 
Nota I - 'Initiative in the investment field is left completely to the 
private entrepreneur. The government limits itself to the selection of 
projects and the establishment of priorities... The submission of indus­
trial projects makes it possible for the government to obtain a clear 
concept of the needs which the coming years will bring in the field of 
power supply and transportation. It is thus possible to make plans for 
power supply and the transportation system. The projects in this field 
are therefore closely related to the industrialisation program: their
realisation is a necessary condition for the accomplishment of the in-
41)dustrialisation plan'
It is an eloquent illustration of the compartmentalisation of reconstruc­
tion policy that agricultural schemes were presented separately. Inter­
bank Nota II, it is true, gave agriculture a cursory treatment and Indus- 
trialisatie Nota I assigned the sector a not insignificant role in 
closing the predicted balance-of-payments gap but for the rest, the 
propagation of agricultural schemes took place via quite different 
government channels. Agricultural policy was presented in the annual 
budgetary comments and was also integrated into (or, more accurately, 
tacked onto) Lieftinck's annual foreign exchange notas. Towards the end




























































































the minister for agriculture, S.L. Mansholt announced his 'restructuring*
plans. In essence the policy involved a committment to continue the
expansion of the animal sector, though within the limits dictated by export
opportunities, but to replace 'about 1/3' of the pre-war level of imports
. 44)of animal feed by domestic production which would yield a foreign-
. 45)exchange saving of f 100 million . Unlike industry, the implementation
of the programme rested almost entirely with government iniative since,
in 1949, for example 23 percent of agricultural imports and 51 percent
. . 46)of agricultural exports flowed via the channels of the Ministry 
which, moreover, had extensive powers in the fixing of domestic prices 
and the approval of land-usage and animal stock numbers.
We will return to examine the results of reconstruction policy in a later 
section of this paper but before then, in the next section, we will examine 
the one crucial bottleneck in the realisation of all these schemes - 
that of finding the necessary finance.
43)
RECONSTRUCTION POLICY AND FOREIGN EXCHANGE AVAILABILITY
The consumption and reconstruction needs of a goods-hungry, war-torn 
economy obviously had the effect of placing the current account balance 
under considerable strain. The deficits incurred in this period could be 
met in a number of ways - long or short term borrowing abroad, the reduc­
tion of gold and foreign exchange assets held by the Central Bank, the 
liquidation of foreign currency assets and, of importance later on, the 
receipt of foreign currency grants (Marshall Aid) and the utilisation 
of multilateral swings within a payments union (The European Payments 
Union). A global survey of the contribution of these various sources to 
the solution of the Dutch foreign payments problem is provided in Table 
Five (the table excludes the Dutch experience within the payments union 
which is shown separately in Fig.Two , P- 48a).
What the data in Table Five indicates is the actual course of events. 
What it cannot reveal (and nothing really can) is the effects of measures 
of import restriction when these sources threatened to prove inade­
quate to cover anticipated requirements of foreign currency and, in the 




























































































shortage which blighted most of Europe with increasing force throughout 
1947 was also experienced by the Netherlands and threatened seriously to 
undermine the progress of economic recovery. Its effects on the purchasing 
programmes envisaged by the government are described in the paragraphs 
below.
Table Five Survey of the Dutch Foreign Payments Position 1945-1951 
(million guilders)
1946 1947 1948 1949 1950 1951
Balance of Payments 
on Current Account
-1312 -1667 -1 136 -222 -1066 -90
Balance of Payments:
Current and Capital Account
-1637 -2035 -1469 -982 -1362 -446
Long term credits 704 701 418 3 163 -
Compulsory Sales of 
Private Assets
306 747 432 205 134 130
Monetary Gold 
(- = increase)
-22 563 153 -86 -305 -10
Other Monetary Movements 649 24 -188 -1 228 -177
Net Marshall Aid 615 720 814 503
Net OEEC Drawing rights 39 141 328
and initial EPU credit position 1637 2035 1469 982 1362 446
Source: P. Lieftinck, The Post-war Financial Rehabilitation of the
Netherlands, The Hague, 1973, 24-25.
For the first eighteen months after the War, the need to obtain foreign 
credits had proved a continuous though not insumountable problem but 
towards the end of 1946 it began to assume crisis proportions.
In September 1946 a dollar purchasing programme had been drawn up 
envisaging civil expenditure of $ 730 million (/ 1936 million) distri­
buted between industry $ 582 million (/ 1544 million) and agriculture 
$ 148 million (/ 393 million). Even before the question had reached cabinet 
level, the obvious unwillingness of the Ministry of Finance to countenance 
a purchasing programme of that magnitude had forced a reassessment - a 
reassessment which because of the minimum consumption levels already 
prevailing, had been exacted entirely at the expense of industry. The new 




























































































purchasing to $ 370 million (/ 982 million) but on the other hand agri­
cultural purchases, in anticipation of price increases, had been raised 
to $ 174.2 million (/ 462 million). A further programme was also drawn up 
in line with the Ministry of Finance estimate that dollar cover available 
in 1947 would not exceed $ 400 million (/ 1061 million) with industry 
allocated $ 280 million (/ 743 million) and agriculture $ 120 million 
(/ 318 million). The report argued that $ 544 million must be seen as 
a 'mimimum programme' and that any further reduction would have serious 
consequences for consumption levels (with a reduction of existing rations) 
investment (with a 25 percent reduction in metals and machinery) and 
exports. Should a lower programme become necessary it was argued that the 
system itself should be changed from an 'order' programme to a 'payments' 
programme which would permit orders with long delivery dates still to be 
placed and the dollar allocation to be used for goods with short delivery/ 
payment dates. In cabinet Huijsmans defended the $ 544 million 
programme us an 'absolute minimum' and Kuin, the authors of the original 
report, estimated that the savings of $ 182 million between the two 
programmes would involve net export losses worth / 350 million (though 
not necessarily in dollars). Although Lieftinck declared a willingness 
to go only as far as $ 500 million, cabinet eventually accepted the
$ 544 million programme (/ 1443 million). It was also decided to adopt
48)the change-over to 'payments quotas' - a decision which was later
to rebound on the proponents of the idea. In February 1947 Lieftinck
hardened his line. $ 165 million worth of orders placed in 1946 fell due
for payment in 1947 and since, he argued, the country was operating
'payments-quotas' , it could no longer be assumed that the same carry-over
would exist at the end of the year. This, combined with the fact that
. 49)anticipated credits were unlikely to materialise in time and that the 
sale of dollar assets was proceeding more slowly than anticipated meant 
that the country would face a severe liquidity crisis by mid-year.
Despite resistance from Huijsmans and Mansholt, in particular, it was 
decided i) to attempt to block all open orders from 1946 and to consider 
them anew as part of the 1947 programme ii) to establish a new commission 
to work out dollar import requirements and iii) in the meantime to 
approve dollar allocations for only 75 percent of the $ 544 million 
already a g r e e d . I n  May the priorities commission eventually submitted 
a series of reports. As far as civil dollar purchases were concerned 




























































































with industry and agriculture to receive $ 280 million (/ 742 million) and
$ 175 million (/ 464 million) respectively. With any lower sum it would
'be impossible to avoid calamities' and there would exist 'the probability
of an economic debacle'. ^  Cabinet met no less than five times to
consider the report and managed eventually to massage the dollar programme
52)for the year upwards to $ 486 million (/ 1289 million)
With the acceptance of the new dollar purchasing programme in June 1947, 
the issue subsided for a number of months only to flare up again towards 
the end of the year. The first problem which presented itself was the 
dollar requirements for the last quarter of 1947 itself. Of the $ 486 
million agreed for the year as a whole, the foreign exchange commission 
had released $ 412 million to the central import-export agency, leaving 
only $ 74 million for the last quarter. On top of this Mansholt requested 
a further $ 45 million to cover the price increases in agricultural 
produce whilst industry claimed an extra $ 5 million. Neither Lieftinck 
nor Holtrop, President of the Nederlandsche Bank, were prepared to sanction 
any extra dollar expenditure in 1947 arguing that it would mean a carry­
over into 1948 of $ 180-200 million whilst the available cover amounted 
to only $ 140 million. The solution which they suggested lay in finan­
cing the extra $ 45 million for agriculture by reductions in the rest 
of the 1947 programme - reductions which were possible since the central 
import-export agency had not yet converted its total exchange allocation 
into import licences (a sum which Holtrop estimated at $ 136 million). On 
the other hand it was argued by officials from the Ministry of Economic 
Affairs (Huijsmans, because of illness, attended his last cabinet meeting 
in August 1947) that if agriculture were to receive its extra allowance,
the 'savings' would be entirely at the expense of industrial imports.
53)Nonetheless cabinet endorsed Lieftmcks and Holtrop s suggestion.
No sooner had this issue been resolved, to the disadvantage of the indus­
trial recovery programme, than a new problem presented itself in the 
form of the dollar-expenditure programme for 1948.
The signal for this new discussion was the balance-of-payments forecasts 
made by the CPB for 1948 which appeared in October 1947 and which predic­
ted a current account deficit of / 1800 million on current account and a 
foreign-exchange gap (after discounting the effects of 'normal' foreign 




























































































a series of measures including a reduction in rations (yielding / 285
million in foreign exchange) and reductions in industrial investment
below that predicted (yielding / 155 million but at the expense of a
26 percent reduction in investment in industrial machinery and equipment)
which could reduce the foreign-exchange gap to / 600 million - the saving
to be achieved by f 560 million reduction in consumption, / 232 million
54)reduction in investment and f 127 million in military expenditure.
A number of factors played a role in the subsequent cabinet discussions.
In the first place there was the prospect of Marshall Aid. In November
1947 Hirschfeld"^ , the Dutch negotiator at the OEEC, had declared him­
self confident that the Netherlands would receive $ 400-450 million in 
Marshall Aid in the fiscal year 1948/9 and that it would come on 
stream in time (he was correct in his former assumption but not on the 
latter - by May 1948 the Netherlands had received only $ 10 million’’*^) 
but Lieftinck was far more pessimistic and urged cabinet not to delay in 
drawing up an emergency programme to be implemented in the eventuality 
of a delay‘d .  A second factor was that no matter who was correct on the 
timing of Marshall Aid, there was the question of the immediate liquidity 
position. Holtrop, for one, was determined to force the issue. Having 
pointed out that the dollar reserves of the Nederlandsche Bank had dwindled 
to $ 20.4 million, he wrote that 'in the light of present circumstances,
I would not wish to carry any responsibility for gold sales which took the 
figure for gold reserves at the Nederlandsche Bank below a figure of
58)/ 500 million as long as an emergency programme is not in operation' 
Lieftinck, too, took the stance that he was not prepared to take the 
consequences if an emergency programme were not introduced - he wanted to 
see a reduction in foreign exchanges losses by / 500 million, all to be 
realised in the first half of the year. By way of a suggestion he hypo­
thesised a / 370 million saving in consumption and f 130 million saving 
in investment. Cabinet reluctantly agreed to examine the possibility for 
a plan to reduce the current account deficit to f 1300 million, which
would restrict dollar purchases to $ 320 million in the first half of 
59)1948 . A month later,in December 1947, Lieftinck announced that only
$ 150 million was available for that period and that, as a result, total 
dollar purchases for the first quarter of 1948 could not exceed $ 75 
millions^^. For the second quarter, in anticipation of Marshall Aid and 
the granting of a second loan from the International Bank for Reconstruc­
tion and Development, the dollar allocation was raised, first to $ 90 




























































































From mid-1948 onwards the dollar situation began to ease as the flow of
Marshall Aid gradually brought to an end the stifling effects which the
exchange crisis had had on the economy - though it should be noted that
the plan to reduce the current account imbalance to / 1300 million remained
in force . It was also marked the end of a period in which cabinet
policy regarding the tempo of economic recovery and development had
effectively been in the grip of the country's Minister of Finance. The
turning-point came in May 1948 when cabinet met to consider van den Brink's
plans for electrification. The Plan was designed in two stages i) by the
Winter of 1951/52 the construction of a national grid and a modest increase
in capacity ii) between 1952 and 1955 the replacement of 60,000 kw p.a.
and an increase of capacity by 125,000 kw p.a. Between 1948 and 1951 the
plan would require an investment of f 535 million of which / 215 million
64)would require foreign exchange (/ 62 million in 1948 alone) Lieftinck 
opposed the scheme arguing that orders should be placed, only when it was 
known where the foreign exchange to cover them was to come from.
Van den Brink, however, refused to delay. The balance of payments plan had 
forseen the 1948 foreign exchange expenditure, he argued, and the foreign 
exchange needed for other orders placed immediately would not be required 
for some time. 'There are large interests at stake so that if, led by 
too much caution, we aim too low, energy provision could later form 
a bottleneck for future economic development'. Lieftinck's objections 
were swept aside and Van den Brink was authorised to commence with his 
s c h e m e . I t  was the first time that Lieftinck had been defeated on such 
a major issue.
Riding on the wave of Marshall Aid funds the Dutch economy entered the 
phase of an investment boom the stated goal of which was to produce 
such a structural change in the economy as to enable the country to stand 
on its own two feet in its dealings with the rest of the World by the 
time American aid dried up in 1952. The fact that the investment boom it­
self might be partly the cause of the continuous and chronic current 
account deficits was a possibility that scarcely impinged upon cabinet 
policy in these years. A suggestion by Lieftinck that the Netherlands 
should cut back its bid for 1949/50 from $ 335 million because of its 
inflationary consequences found no response whatsoever with his colleagues. 
Van den Brink argued, 'When business itself is willing to invest, then 




























































































to secure sufficient investment would later confront it with inflationary 
pressure of a different kind - that of financing unemployment pay.^*^ In 
October 1949 Van den Brink argued again against dampening the boom,
'My opinion is that it would not be logical, as long as the means are 
available, for the expansion of Dutch industry and,with it,the creation of 
a solid basis for the recovery of balance of payments equilibrium not 
to use these to the full. When Marshall Aid ends our country will be 
better served by a powerful export industry than by a certain sum of £ 7 \
foreign exchange raised as a result of a policy of investment restriction'
What brought the boom to an end was the alarming deterioration in the
balance-of-payments in the course of 1950 when a deterioration in the
terms-of-trade as a result of the Korean crisis compounded the effects of
domestic monetary policy. In September 1950 the Nederlandsche Bank raised
the rediscount rate from 25% to 3 percent (the first rise since the War)
and at the same time announced tighter controls on the commercial banking
sector designed to some into force in January 1951 (at which point the
rediscount rate was raised again to 4 percent). In December the CPB report
commissioned by cabinet was discussed. It estimated that the balance of
payments deficit in 1951 was likely to be f 650 million and in 1952
/ 300 million. One option suggested was to ride this out using reserves,
EPU drawing rights and Marshall Aid but the report advised against this
i) because the growing German deficit in the EPU was likely to lead to
measures which could rebound onto Dutch exports ii) because military
expenditure may need to be increased still further and iii) because
6 8 )the terms of trade could deteriorate further than predicted
Holtrop declared his willingness to commit reserves to financing the
deficit only if it were matched by a 'forceful financial policy'. The
tenor of the meeting was in sympathy with this but there was a reluctance
to commit the government to a deflationary fiscal policy until the
forecasts had been checked and until a more detailed study had been made
of the possible distribution of the measures between consumption and 
69)investment cuts. The new report which was ready in January 1951 was 
even more pessimistic about the current account deficit which it 
estimated at / 800 million in 1951. The deficit on current and capital 
account was put at f 1200 million of which / 600 million could be covered 
by Marshall Aid. In order to achieve the necessary foreign-exchange savings 
of / 600 million, domestic expenditure would need to be reduced by 




























































































reduced by a further / 500 million to allow an increase in military 
expenditure. Although the reports recommendations fell into a majority 
recommendation and two minority recommendations, there was unanimity on 
the effects on investment: the impact was estimated at a 20-25 percent 
reduction in total investment (this figure also includes civil construction 
programmes) when the effects of the Nederlandsche Bank measures had been 
taken into a c c o u n t . T h e  cabinet accepted the investment cutting measures 
with relatively little discussion - the debate centred largely round 
the question of how to achieve the necessary cuts in the consumption 
sector.When, later, the cabinet obtained the agreement of the Unions 
to achieve part of the consumption cuts through an only partial wage 
compensation for the rise in prices the package, which was announced in 
March 1951, was complete. The goal of balance-of-payments equilibrium by 
1952 was not finally to be achieved purely by the 'restructuring' 
policies which had been pursued since 1948 but by a sharp dose of neo­
classical deflationary policy.
THE ACHIEVEMENTS OF RECONSTRUCTION POLICY
The measures announced in the March 1951 programme marked a shift in 
the accent of economic policy away from 'restructuring' policy, with 
its emphasis on the primacy of investment, towards short-term macro- 
economic management;, with balance-of-payments equilibrium as its central 
target. The March 1951 programme was astoundingly successful. The long 
succession of monthly deficits was arrested and reversed in mid-1951 and 
a new era of successive surplusses was launched. Part of the credit for 
this achievement in the short-term lay with the improvement in the 
Dutch terms of trade which accompanied the end of the Korean-war boom but the 
longer-term success was based solidly upon the foundations of the re­
structuring achieved during the reconstruction period itself.
The most noticeable change in the economic structure of the Netherlands
was the degree of further industrialisation which was achieved. Industry's
share in national income rose from 31 percent in 1938 (34 percent a
72)year later) to 39 percent by 1951 . Details of the progress of indus­










































































































































































































































































































































































Before 1948 the necessary data to shed much light on this industrial 
development is relatively scarce, and much of what there is, is fairly 
unreliable. This increase in industrial activity was, in turn, attributable 
to the vast sums of industrial investment and the improvement in labour 
productivity which it brought in its wake. The data for gross fixed 
industrial invesment is given in Table Six.
Table Six Gross Fixed Industrial Investment (million guilders)
1946 1947 1948 1949 1950 1951 1952
Current Prices 615 725 1010 1200 1355 1620 850
% Nat.Income at 
factor cost
6 .6 6.4 9.8 8.9 9.1 9.6 —
1948 prices 1010 1180 1295 1390 655
Sources: Investment Figures, K.G. de Groot, De Financiering van de Indus-
trialisatie in Nederland, Leiden, 1957, 79. Vierde Nota inzake 
de industrialisatie van Nederland, Handelingen van der Staaten- 
Generaal 1952-1953, 2959.
National Income: Centraal Bureau voor de Statistiek, Tachtig 
jaren statistiek in tijdreeksen, 1899-1979, The Hague, 1979,
144. Idem. Statistische en econometrische onderzoekingen,
Vol. 7, No. 3 (1953), 96.
One fact which is apparent from Table Six is how close the investment plans 
contained in Industrialisatie Nota's I and II came to realisation. In 
the period covered by the Nota's, gross industrial investment amounted to 
/ 5530 million (/ 2835 million replacement investment and / 2695 new 
investment) at 1948 prices which amounted to between 95 and 97 percent of 
the targets. Unfortunately since the realisation figures are only broken 
down into separate industrial sectors in terms of gross investment, it is 
only possible to compare the results with the investment programme in 
Industrialisatie Nota II (see Tabel Seven) but that shows a level of 
predictive accuracy which many present-day planners, including those in 




























































































Table Seven Forecasts and Realisation of Gross Industrial Investment 











Metals and Electrotechnical 1250 2 1 .6 1 190 21.5
Electricity, Gas, Water 1 100 19.0 1 160 2 1 .0
Chemicals (exl. rayon) 580 10.0 530 9.6
Food and Drink 670 1 1.6 660 11.9
Coal 350 6 .0 255 4.6
Textiles 640 11.0 580 10.5
Oil 340 5.9 320 5.8
Paper 175 3.0 160 2.9
Ceramics and Building 335 5.7 330 6 .0
Leather and Rubber 95 1.6 80 1.4
Wood 90 1 .6 95 1.7
Various 175 3.0 170 3. 1
5800 5530
Source: Vierde Nota inzake de industrialisatie van Nederland, Handelingen
van der Staten-Generaal 1952-1953, 2959.
The actual contribution of the government itself to this development can
be measured in a number of ways. In the first place central and local
government participated directly in investment to the tune of some
/ 1400 million (in 1948 prices) or virtually 25 percent. Most of this was
accounted for by the electricity programmes and by investment in coal
mining. The State also contributed f 80 million to the establishment
of a rolling mill and tin factory (the N.V. Breeband project) in
partnership with the steelworks Hoogovens, IJmuiden^and to the expansion
of the chemicals side of its coal-mining interests, Staatsmijnen. In
addition, via the so-called Herstelbank (a mixed industrial investment
bank founded in November 1945 in which the State contributed just over
half the share capital) the State advanced / 249,912,000 in the form of
new investment credits to industry between 1948 and 1951, equivalent to
73)4.8 percent of gross industrial investment at current prices . The 
majority of the industrial investment in this 'restructuring' phase, 
however, was raised by the private sector. A 'cautious' estimate made in 
1954 suggests that of the total private sector investment made between 




























































































shares, 4.5 percent from loans from the Herstelbank (together with a
relatively small amount issued under government guarantee from the
Netherlands Middenstandbank) and 3.5 percent from loans from other
commercial banks. But by far the largest share, 77.8 percent, was 
. . 74)internally financed . In this area, too, the contribution of the State 
was important in two respects; firstly in the introduction of favourable 
depreciation and asset revaluation allowances for taxation purposes^*^ and secondly 
through a wages policy which held the rise in real wages, after an initial 
hike in 1945, broadly in check^^.
More indirectly, the State contributed to the expansion of industry, and 
other sectors of the economy as well, though infrastructural improvement.
In terms of energy provision (which is included under industry) it 
succeeded in more than doubling pre-war levels of electricity output - 
from 3688 million Kwh in 1938 to 7911 Kwh by 1951 though it failed to 
restore pre-war levels of coal production^^.
Nearly a third of the railway network had been electrified by 1951 compared
with nearly 15 percent in 1938 and the volume of freight carried in terms
78)of tonnen/km was increased by 47 percent over the same period.
Table Eight Index of Gross Agricultural Production (1938/39 = 100)
1938/39 1946/47 1947/48 1948/49 1949/50 1950/51
Arable 100 113 108 117 141 121
Dairy 100 53 56 65 86 100
Market Gardening 100 118 141 139 177 154
TOTAL 100 68 73 80 103 107
Source: Calculated from: De Nederlandse Volkshuishouding in de periode
1945-1955 in: Maandschrift van het Centraal Bureau voor de 
Statistiek, Vol. 50, no. 4 (1955), 314.
Agriculture, too, succeeded in registering considerable further expansion 
once 'recovery' had been achieved in 1948/49 (see Table Eight) and indeed 
increased its share in national income from 10 percent in 1938 to 14 
percent by 1951 . Moreover it was also successful in terms of its own
'restructuring' goals. By 1949/50, with the tonnage of animal-feed 
consumption back to its pre-war level, the percentage imported had fallen 




























































































Table Nine The Composition of the Balance of Payments on Current Account 
(million guilders) transaction basis
1938 1946 1947 1948 1949 1950 1951 1952
Imports (f.o.b.) 1318 2146 3759 4428 4780 7212 8351 7177
Exports (f.o.b.) 1086 816 1897 2658 3644 5253 7011 7464
Balance of trade -232 -1330 -1862 -1770 -1136 -1959 -1340 +287
% imports covered 
by exports
82.4 38.0 50.4 60.0 76.2 72.8 84.0 104.0
Net invisibles 337 18 195 323 824 828 1017 1468
Current account 
balance
105 -1312 -1667 -1447 -312 -1 131 -269 + 1755
Invisibles as % 
of imports
25.6 neg. 5.2 7.2 17.2 11.5 12.2 10.4
Invisibles as % 
of exports
31.0 neg. 10.3 12.2 22.6 15.8 14.5 23.5
Source: Centraal Bureau voor de Statistiek, Tachtig jaren statistiek in 
tijdreeksen, 1899-1979, The Hague, 1979, 148.
Despite the economic development which had occurred, the balance of 
payments remained in chronic deficit throughout the reconstruction period. 
The data in Table Nine allows a partial analysis of the reasons behind 
this. Immediately apparent is the fact that the import cover provided by 
exports only began to approach pre-war levels in 1951, when the measures 
to curb consumption and to dampen the investment boom began to take 
effect. In 1952, which has been included to offer a contrast with more 
'normal' times, the balance of trade actually showed a surplus (some­
thing which was not to happen until 1972) but in the following two years 
as well, the import cover remained well above the pre-war level, which 
suggests that the balance of trade problem was indeed one of excessive 
import levels. This suggestion would appear to be confirmed by Table Ten 
which illustrates the success of reconstruction policy in reorienting the 




























































































Table Ten Exports as a percentage of National Income at Factor Cost
1938 1946 1947 1948 1949 1950 1951 1952
22.1 8.7 16.9 22.0 26.9 35.2 41.4 42.2
Source: Exports - See Table Nine
National Income - See sources cited in Table Six.
As early as 1948 the economy was exporting proportionally as much as it 
had done in 1938 (though not as much, yet, as before the Depression - 
in 1930 the figure had stood at 29.4 percent) and by 1951 the share 
of exports in national income had increased by no less than 88 percent.
The other aspect which is revealed clearly by Table Nine is the weakness 
anticipated by post-war policy-makers in the position of net invisible 
earnings. Whether expressed as a percentage of imports,, or even of exports, 
these failed noticeably in recapturing their pre-war importance in the 
balance of payments.
Table Eleven The Composition of Exports (percent)
1946 1947 1948 1949 1950 1951 1952
Agriculture 48.9 45.2 47. 1 50.4 48.4 43.6 43.7
Industry 
of which
51.1 54.8 52.9 49.6 51.6 56.4 56.3
Chemicals 6.4 8.4 9. 1 7.7 7.6 8.2 7.5
Textiles 9.3 13. 1 13.0 11.5 11.6 11.0 10.0
Fuel 3.2 2.4 3.7 4.3 10. 1 7.8 9.7
Metal, Machine, 
Transport






Sources: P. Fortuyn, Sociaal-economische politiek in Nederland, 1945-1949,
Alphen aan de Rijn, 474.
Centraal Bureau voor de Statistiek, Tachtig jaren statistiek 
in tijdreeksen, 1899-1979, The Hague, 1979, 114.
Finally, before leaving this discussion on the impact of reconstruction 
policy on the international position of the Dutch economy, it is worth 




























































































feature here is the long continued importance of agricultural products 
in the export package. In spite of the early stress in Dutch plans on the 
need for industrailisation to resolve the balance of payments problem, 
it was not until 1952 that the balance in the composition of exports shifted 
decisively, and permanently, in favour of industrial products. Indeed it 
was the expectation that the solution of the balance-of-payments problem 
depended upon industry which proved the only miscalculation which the 
planners had made. In 1948 Interbank Nota II had virtually ignored agri­
culture and services altogether as far as closing the balance-of-payments 
was concerned and although Industrialisatie Nota I expected them together 
to contribute / 1300 million in foreign exchange saving, it expected indus­
try to contribute / 1500 million (see p.  14)- In the event, if we take 
1948 as the starting point, the balance-of-payments had turned around by 
by 1952 to the tune of / 1763 million. The agricultural trade balance 
showed a turn-around of f 1699 million. Net .invisible earnings had 
improved by f 1145 million. The industrial balance had actually deterio-
THE NEED TO REORIENT FOREIGN ECONOMIC POLICY
From as early as March 1947 Dutch reconstruction policy had recognised 
that the economic rehabilitation fo the country depended upon the increasing 
international orientation of its productive structure but it was one 
thing to recognise this, it was quite another to achieve it. That the 
economy indeed succeeded is evident from the discussion on the 'achievements 
of reconstruction policy' but that success was not only contingent upon 
the efforts of domestic policy, it also depended on the creation of a 
network of accomodation, agreements and treaties in the international 
sphere which not only facilitated the (re-)opening of export markets for 
Dutch goods and services but which was also accompanied by a reorientation 
of the country's entire trading network.





























































































Table Twelve Percentage Distribution of Sources of Dutch Imports and 









Germany U.K. BLEU France
1938 10.5 7.0 55.8 21.3 8.7 11.7 4.7
1946 24.3 0.9 52.2 2.5 16.9 13.7 4.4
1947 28.0 4.6 43.2 2.3 9.9 12.2 4.7
1948 17.4 6.7 49.9 5.4 9.9 14.7 4.9
1949 16.5 7.6 53.0 6.8 11 .6 14.3 6.7
1950 11.5 6.5 57.1 12.3 10.5 18.4 4.7









Germany U.K. BLEU France
1938 4.3 9.6 66. 1 14.6 22. 1 10.6 5.9
1946 7.2 3.3 72.7 6.4 10.9 20.8 7.0
1947 3.2 7.1 66.4 3. 1 12.8 15.6 7.3
1948 3. 1 7.4 68. 1 5.9 14.5 15.6 8. 1
1949 3.4 10.2 67.6 10.7 16.3 13.3 7. 1
1950 5.0 5.9 70.3 20.6 14.7 13.5 4.5
1951 6.1 5.8 66.5 13.9 15.9 14.8 4.5
Source: Calculated from: Centraal Bureau voor de Statistiek,
Tachtig jaren statistiek in tijdreeksen, 1899-1979, 
The Hague, 1979, 112, 115-118.
Outside Western Europe two major areas attracted the concern of policy­
makers namely the change in the trading position vis-a-vis the United 
States and the possible implications of the loss of Indonesia for the 




























































































more deeply. The need to reorient foreign economic within the context of 
Western Europe will be dealt with separately in the next section.
The immediate contribution of the changing trade relationship with the 
USA to the dollar crisis which for more than a year had hamstrung recon­
struction policy is evident from Table Twelve (it should be noted here 
that another major contributory factor lay in the policies adopted by 
the occupation authorities in West Germany - see pp. 36-38). Dutch 
trade with the USA had shown an almost traditional pattern of deficits 
since the end of the First World War but at least in 1938, for example, 
the Netherlands had been able to cover nearly 30 percent of its imports 
from the USA with the receipts from its exports - in 1947 the equivalent 
figure had dropped to 5.2 percent. The flow of Marshall Aid had contributed 
to the short-term solution of the problem firstly by the advance of funds 
to enable the dollar deficit to be covered and secondly by enabling the 
economy to finance imports from elsewhere in Europe (and the rest of the 
World) thus shifting its import dependence away from the USA itself. 
However, these measures could do nothing to revive the level of exports 
to the United States and the economy was still left saddled with a 
structural problem of potentially considerable dimensions, since by
1949 the percentage cover of imports was still less than half what it
go)
had been in 1938 . In August 1949 the possibility of a devaluation of
the guilder as a solution to the dollar problem was first raided in
cabinet ' and the question was discussed again three weeks later
but nonetheless the announcement of the sterling devaluation caught the
government completely by surprise. There was no doubt that the guilder
should devalue - the question was by how much. One group argued that the
guilder should not go the whole way with the pound but should devalue by
only 25 percent. This was felt to be possible since Dutch prices had
not risen as far as English prices and a lower devaluation would reduce
the pressure on the cost-of-living and, with it, the chances of labour
unrest. Against this group was ranged the majority of cabinet who argued
that the devaluation did not just concern Britain but the whole sterling
bloc and that not to follow the full sterling devaluation would be to
jeapardize the Netherlands' competitive position in World markets. In
the event the majority prevailed; the guilder was devalued by 30 percent
85 )to a rate of f 3.80:$ 1 '. Although it would be wrong to attribute
everything that happened next exclusively to the devaluation, the fall 
in export dependence and, more importantly, the rise in import shares 




























































































export cover of imports had risen to 30% and the following year the figure
had reached 41.9 percent and was to remain above that figure for the next
. 86 )three years.
For a long time historians of the Netherlands had cherished exaggerated 
notions over the importance of the Dutch East Indian colonial possessions 
for the prosperity of the domestic economy before the War and, as a result, 
an exaggerated impression of the negative impact of decolonisation in the 
immediate post-war period. Some years ago these original estimates were 
reworked with the result that the real impact of Indonesian independence 
was reduced to a problem of more manageable proportions. Whereas the 
calculations made immediately after the War suggested that the Dutch East 
Indies in 1938 had contributed 13.7 percent to Dutch national income in 
that year, the revised calculations reduced that figure to 7.9 percent.
Nor was all of this 'lost' after the War. since even after independence, 
Indonesia did not slip off the face of the earth but continued to engage 
in trade and other economic activities with its ex-colonial rulers. In 
the years 1948-50 the contribution of Indonesia to the national income 
of the Netherlands was estimated at respectively 2.8, 4.4 and 2.5
87,\
percent. Nor can a direct assessment of the 'loss' be achieved by a
simple process of subtraction since the post-war figures are expressed
as a percentage of a national income which, in real terms, may be tentatively
88)put at 25 percent above that in 1938 . There is also a feature which
both old and new calculations tended to overlook and that is the impor­
tance of the area as a source of imports and that role, as Table Twelve 
reveals, was, with the exception of the immediate post-war years, hardly 
damaged at all. Moreover, given the increasing share of exports in 
national income (see Table Ten) it is clear that the economy made good its 
slipping foothold on the Indonesian markets by the diversion of exports 
elsewhere.
Although both the American and Indonesian questions loomed large in the 
perspectives of post-war policy-makers their gravest concerns affected 
Western Europe, traditionally the largest source of imports and even more 
so, the largest market for exports and an area in which virtually all 
trade and payments movements after the war were shackled in a system of 
bilateral treaties. At least if was better to have some treaty than none 
at all. Compared with 1937/38 the volume of Dutch exports to 'treaty' 




























































































expansion in export volume of 47 percent but Dutch policy-makers saw 
their country's interests better served by a reduction in levels of 
protectionism elsewhere than by the negotiation of highly specific trade 
treaties. Because of the way European history was to develop such aims 
have often been interpreted as a movement towards European economic 
integration, which is what, with hind-sight, they turned out to be. 
However, it would be wrong to view Dutch efforts in this direction in 
this light. For much of the period Dutch policy goals were more in the 
direction of returning the World to a pre-1914 type era of relatively free 
movements of goods and capital. It was largely only the fact that a 
limited number of countries were willing, together, to go some way to 
achieving this that led to an often reluctant committment of more res­
tricted forms of cooperation and integration.
89)
THE NETHERLANDS AND THE ECONOMIC INTEGRATION OF EUROPE
Within Europe the greatest cause for concern was Germany which before 
the War had been the largest Dutch supplier of imports and its second most 
important market for exports (see Table Twelve). Nothing which the war 
had done could erease the fact that Germany was indispensable for the 
long-term recovery of the Dutch economy. However there was more than 
one way in which German recovery could be arranged to contribute to 
Dutch reconstruction - firstly a large part of Germany (preferably 
without Germans) could be allowed to recover as part of a 'Greater 
Holland' and, secondly, if this were not possible, German recovery could 
be encouraged under some form of international supervision and control. 
Thus the fact that policy-makers could consider at one and the same time 
the dismemberment of the German state and the rehabilitation of the 
German economy is not quite as schizophrenic as it at first sight may 
appear. When, mercifully, the Allies stamped on the wilder annexationist 
dreams, Dutch policy goals could be more straightforwardly expressed in 
the following way: the Netherlands could consider no form of international 
cooperation which would exclude its largest trading partner.
Annexation, as an officially recognised policy option, was first announced 
by the Dutch government-in-exile when news of the innundations first 




























































































government stated, 'Considering further that it is in the general interest
that Germany be made to realise once and for all that aggression does not
pay, it is possible that the people of the Netherlands may reach the
conclusion, in spite of their innate repugnance to all forms of armed
conquest, that if in their case some substantial measure of reparation
is to be made by the invader, a suitable part of adjoining Prussian
territory should be ceded to the Netherlands (provision being made for
the absorption by Germany of the Prussian inhabitants), or be brought
into the dominion and economic orbit of the Netherlands in some other
manner, on a provisional or permanent basis' In July 1945 the new
government appointed a special commission to examine the scope of any 
91)possible claim but before it could report, the Foreign Minister,
92) . . . .Van Kieffens submitted his own scheme. The area he had in mind had
2 . . 93)an area of 10,500 km and a population of approximately 1,500,000 Germans
Had it been adopted it would have meant a claim equivalent to 32 percent
of the area of the Netherlands itself but at a special meeting in Sep-
94)tember 1945 cabinet rejected the idea . It was not until May 1946
that the special commission was ready to report its findings. The
commission itself was split and as a result offered two variants - a
2 . .maximum variant encompassing an area of 4,348 km with 403,000 inhabitants
2 . 95)and a minimum variant of 3586km with 298,000 inhabitants. With only
the smallest of majorities (6-5) was the maximum scheme rejected^\
a decision reaffirmed three weeks later again with a paper thin (7-6)
97)majority . The result still left a claim equivalent to 11 percent of the 
size of the Netherlands. The situation then began to change rapidly.
In the first place it became clear the Allies would not be prepared to 
countenance an annexation on the scale being considered by the govern­
ment and, in response to this, in July 1946, it was agreed to reexamine
98)
the claim with a view to 'frontier corrections' rather than annexation 
Secondly, within cabinet there was a growing realisation that territorial 
adjustments would be accompanied with the sitting inhabitants and that 
if these numbered several hundred thousand, the country faced an assimi- 
lation problem of considerable magnitude . After much deliberation by 
November 1946, the Dutch plan was ready. It proposed 'correcting' the 
border from a length of 525 kms. to 340 kms. but the territorial 'correc­
tions' needed to accomplish this embraced 1,750 km2 of territory with 
119,000 German inhabitants^^. The matter now lay in the hands of the 




























































































Even before any official reaction had been received Prime Minister Drees 101)
had informed cabinet that the chances of the Dutch claim being met were
slim and that a new minimum programme should be c o n s t r u c t e d . The new
2programme, which was accepted by cabinet m  July 1948 involved 639 km 
of German territory and 39,000 i n h a b i t a n t s . what the Dutch were even­
tually allocated in September 1948 was a mere 69 km^ and 9,200 Germans
Even whilst the cabinet was formulating its ideas for European territorial 
expansion, it was equally concerned to moderate Allied plans for the dis- 
mantleing of German productive capacity (though making sure the Netherlands 
received its share of any dismantled capacity going begging). The Dutch 
had no direct role in the Allied deliberations but it did have an indirect 
access through its participation with BLEU and France' in the Conseil 
Tripartite (for a more detailed description of activities see pp. 40-41 ).
In September 1945 the French attempted to obtain the support of its 
Conseil Tripartite partners for their own proposals for the dismantling 
and transfer to Western Europe of German industrial plant and equipment 
particularly in the iron and steel sector. The Dutch delegates, lacking 
any cabinet instructions, attempted to stall the issue pointing out that 
all the Netherlands had to gain was a loss of export markets, as a result 
of the consequent fall in German purchasing power, and the loss of a 
vital source of imports whilst the others would actually be better off 
as a result of the elimination of German competition in their own and 
third markets. Against this the French warned that too long a delay 
would hake it impossible to present and to defend the interests of the 
other three countries'1 . The meaning within cabinet was unambiguous 
and unanimous on the matter, though the degrees of committment varied. 
Mansholt argued that cabinet should make an open statement of principle 
'that we oppose the deindustrialisation of Germany', Van Kleffens, that 
an alternative should be sought in the form of international control over 
the Ruhr whilst others considered that the Netherlands might be able to go 
some way agreeing to the dismantling of heavy industry if compensation 
could be obtained in other directions. One point was certain - the 
Dutch could not support the French proposals as they s t o o d . The 
French reaction to the Dutch decision de facto to put the entire question 
into cold storage was one of disappointment but they did not, as the 
Dutch had possibly feared, end the Conseil Tripartite cooperation'^"* 
and the whole issue was transfered to the Four-Power negotiations in 
which the French continued to defend its plans independently - without 




























































































With the question of the Allies' long-term strategy towards Germany 
removed from the practical sphere of Dutch foreign policy, attention 
turned to the immediate problem of trading with Germany at all. Before 
the War Germany had been the major supplier of fuel, fertiliser, manufac­
tured goods and semi-manufactures and the largest market for the Dutch 
surplusses of agricultural produce (and particularly of fresh vegetables). 
In addition the earnings from transport service had been a vital element 
in covering not only the trade deficit with Germany but also with the 
rest of the W o r l d E a r l y  in 1946 it had become apparent that not 
only would the Netherlands not be given access to the mark-balances 
they had accumulated during the War for post-war trading and commercial 
purposes, but that the Americans and British were going to insist on the 
settlement of any deficits in dollars. It was equally clear that they 
would attempt to reduce imports into Germany to the basic minimum 
(which would reduce the chances of closing any deficits with traditional 
Dutch agricultural exports). Moreover it was to be expected that they 
would attempt to minimise the foreign exchange costs of shipping by using 
Bremerhaven and Hamburg rather than Rotterdam'^^. By August 1946 dis­
cussions with the British and American authorities had produced nothing 
by way of a solution. 'We are confronted with practically a Chinese 
Wall on our Eastern frontier. Behind it lie two zones in which live 40 
million people who are being suffocated under a well-meaning but incapable 
military administration' wrote Teppema (director of the foreign economic 
policy section in the Ministry of Economic Affairs). In these circumstances 
it fell to the Netherlands to take the initiative in encouraging the 
revival of German industry, and, with it, exports. 'It is not a matter of 
political or other sentiment, but of economic necessity which brings us 
to this ... the greater the necessity because the recovery of Dutch acti­
vity has reached the stage where we are inexorably driven to an internatio­
nal distribution of labour (in which West Germany is an indispensable 
factor) if the gains to date are not to suffer a serious set-back'
The following month the Dutch presented their plan to the American 
occupation authorities. All trade with Germany should flow through a 
trading syndicate, which the Dutch were prepared to front, which would 
be funded by a loan of $ 160 million from the Americans - the sum being 
used to provide a revolving credit for the payment of raw material imports 
for German industry, part of which would be re-exported in manufactured 
form to repay the loan. The plan would enable trade to be freed from the 
bureaucratic channels which currently existed and the fact that it would 




























































































sensitivity of an American dollar loan for German reconstruction. The 
Americans merely stalled. The plan that the Dutch should act as 'banker 
and broker' was considered potentially useful' if presented in the right 
way, at the right place and at an opportune time'. The idea that the 
Americans should fund it was characterised by the Head of the American 
Commerce and Trade section as 'political dynamite' which could be better 
kept (permanently?) in unofficial channels***\ In the event, in January 
1947 a Dutch Trust Company was set up but with far more limited purposes 
than the original proposals. Instead of acting as a catalyst for the 
revival of multilateral trading with Germany, it was merely a way of 
stream-lining Dutch trading contacts with the newly established Joint 
Export-Import Agency (henceforth JEIA) of the US-UK Bizone in Germany.
With the failure of the initiative for the revival of the German 
economy and its reintegration into the European economy. Dutch policy now 
concentrated on breaching the 'Chinese Wall' itself. What the Dutch 
wanted was a bilateral trade agreement with a committment from JEIA 
to accept quotas of imports of goods and services. What they had to 
make do with was a payments agreement - bought at the expense of con­
cessions made almost entirely by the Dutch. For 'essential' goods pay­
ments would be transacted in dollars but whereas the 'essentials' list 
included virtually everything the Dutch might conceivably need from 
Germany, it excluded many traditional Dutch exports (the most important 
being vegetables). For 'non-essential' exports, the Dutch receive credits 
which could be used to purchase goods from the German 'non-essentials'
list (if they were available!) and similar treatment would accrue to any
. . . . 112)surplusses earned from shipping or transit services . In other words 
payments to Germany were to be made in the hardest currency in the World, 
payments from Germany, in the weakest; but the concessions must be seen 
as an attempt to avoid a structural change in the German economy which 
would permanently damage Dutch export opportunities. In July 1948 the Dutch 
finally obtained the trade agreement which they had wanted - an agreement 
which envisaged Dutch imports worth f 230 million and exports worth 
/ 181 million (both levels considerably higher than the result for 1947 
and promising a higher percentage Dutch export cover for imports). The





























































































The result of the July '48/June '49 trade agreement was a bitter dis­
appointment for the Netherlands. Although the Dutch had been granted 
export quotas, the import licences required from JEIA were often either 
subject to long delays or inexplicably refused altogether. Moreover
the transit sector, which had been expected to an yield / 18 million
. . . 114)surplus, actually ended up in deficit . The turn-about came in the 
course of the negotiations for a new trade agreement which were held 
between 22 August and 7 September 1949. They took place when the Allied 
administration of Germany was in a transition phase and German interests 
were represented by both JEIA officials and German negotiators. The 
results of the new agreement involved the complete liberalisation of 
Germany's import regime. 'With one stroke all the obstacles which 
until the most recent past had continuously aroused our 
concern and vexation have been removed. None of the American 
or German organisations or apparatus can any longer .form an 
obstacle', wrote a jubilant Teppema. On the other hand the Netherlands 
retained the right to control its imports from Germany and undertook 
to restrict certain of its exports' In examining the reasons behind
the volte-face, Teppema had no doubts, 'for the new agreement with the 
Western Zones we have chiefly to thank the JEIA which, in the process of 
dying, had still accomplished this one good deed ... although the new 
agreement undoubtedly fits in well to the system of Prof. Erhard, it was 
not to be expected that we would have achieved such a generous agree­
ment had we had to deal with the Germans alone.'"^  In other words, the 
Americans, who were pushing at the time for concrete progress on trade 
and commerce liberalisation in Europe had, as virtually 
its last political act in Germany, given an almost ridiculously one­
sided demonstration of what it hoped to achieve on an European basis.
At least one side of Dutch foreign policy goals had been realised.
Although Germany had yet to be integrated into Europe, Europe's inte­
gration into Germany was now a fact.
The problem of trading with Germany provides at least part of the 
explanation for the often reserved Dutch 'committment' towards Benelux, 
though it is not proposed here to enter into detail concerning the 
various negotiations or of the problems lying behind the progress 
towards closer integration, both of which have already been well-covered 
in the excellent secondary literature on the subject. Highly industrialised 
Belgium, less damaged than either the Netherlands or Germany by the War, 
could be expected to fill some of thé vacuum for vital imports of fuel 
and manufactured goods left by the cirtually disappearance of Germany 




























































































Luxembourg and the Netherlands had signed an agreement to form a customs
union, to be followed at a later stage by a full economic union, as soon
as possible after the War. Partly on the strength of this agreement, the
Netherlands had obtained between October 1944 and June 1945 short-term
credits worth Bfr. 780 million (/ 48.4 million) to finance the import of
essential requirements * *̂ . However the Dutch had considered that their
immediate position ruled out any short-term action on implementing the
customs-union. There matters might have stood had not Speekenbrink (then
head of the foreign economic policy section of the Ministry of Economic
Affairs) informed cabinet in January 1946 that the Belgians were becoming
impatient at the lack of progress and, more chillingly, that the supply
of credits may no longer flow with the same generosity or regularity if
something were not done about it. Added to this, Van Rooyen raised
the spectre that if the Dutch dragged their feet, the Belgians might be
tempted to opt for a customs union with France (see p.  41). Although
both Lieftinck and Vos were dubious whether the time was ripe for such
. . 119)a move, the Prime-Minister, Schermerhorn , summarised the tenor of the 
meeting, 'We cannot avoid, without complications, a customs union. The 
Belgians must be given the feeling that we are treating the matter in a 
bona-fide way'^^. By March 1946 trade with Belgium had stagnated,
especially in iron and steel products, as a result of the drying up of
121) . . . . .  Belgian credits and it was against this background that the ministerial
meeting took place in The Hague in April 1946 which ended with the
triumphant announcement that the Benelux partners intended to implement
a customs union within a year. In the event technical difficulties
involved in standardising the tariff lists, let alone the problem of
deciding on the rates themselves, delayed the implementation of the
customs union until January 1948.
The decision to move the next stage of full economic union was taken at 
the Ministerial meeting at the Chateau d'Ardenne in June 1948 at which 
the target date of December 1950 was fixed for full currency convertability 
among the Benelux partners, the abolition of domestic controls and the 
removal of quantitative import restrictions. The time-table was clearly 
over-optimistic from the start but it was probably designed as much for 
the Americans, who had linked Marshall Aid to the achievement of closer 
European economic cooperation, as for anyone else. As Speekenbrink 
pointed out to cabinet, 'Upto now Benelux has been more a façade than a 
reality. Nonetheless it has delivered important results in the interna­




























































































. . . . . 122)an advertising object; it must now be given real content.' After the
Conference the Dutch had cause to question the wisdom of their committment, 
the major reason being that the simultaneous liberalisation of so many 
controls would seriously damage the balance-of-payments. What was re­
quired, it was felt, was a less ambitious programme (a pre-union period)
accompanied by some form of bridging credit to cover the balance-of-
123)payments effects. On the eve of the next ministerial meeting in The
Hague, in February 1949, the stand-point on the question had hardened.
Both Lieftinck and Van den Brink were firm that there should be no pre­
union either if the Belgians insisted on gold cover for any deficits with
the Netherlands. Drees himself was in favour of postponing the whole scheme
124)altogether were it not that 'agreements have been made and dates named'.
The Dutch demand that the convertibility clause in the Chateau d'Ardenne
agreement be waived kept the entire question of a pre-union agreement
in doubt until September 1949 when the Belgians eventually conceded the
issue: gold and dollar coverage of the Dutch deficit would only become
necessary if the deficit were occasioned by a failure of Dutch exports,
125)and not if it resulted from increased imports . In October 1949 the 
Pre-Union treaty was signed, liberalising intra-Benelux trade flows 
(with certain exceptions) from all quantitative restrictions and in June 
1950 the whole question of currency convertability, which had almost 
brought progress to a halt, was resolved when it became part of the wider 
arrangements within the European Payments Union (see pp. 46-48).
If the Netherlands had shown reluctance in going along with the Benelux 
developments, its standpoint against French initiatives to form a wider 
sphere of cooperation was positively frigid. In April 1945, the repre­
sentatives of the Netherlands, France, Belgium and Luxembourg signed an 
Accord Economique de Consultation Mutuell which committed the governments 
to the coordination of policies in the fields of prices, social security, 
employment, fiscal policy, tariffs, and import quotas and the harmoni­
sation of plans for the establisment of new industries. Although the 
Dutch were not particularly enthusiastic for the idea, they participated
in the initiative for fear that the Belgians might otherwise join without 
126 ̂them. On the more positive side the Conseil Tripartite, as the body
became known, promised to give the Netherlands some indirect leverage 
in the Four Power discussions on Germany, to strengthen their negotiating 
position vis-a-vis the United Kingdom and, quite frankly, to flatter




























































































Although the plenary sessions of the Conseil Tripartite were largely 
devoted to the German question, the work in various subcommittees began 
to move towards giving concrete expression to forms of closer cooperation. 
What the Dutch were totally unprepared for was the French suggestion in 
January 1946 that the group would work as quickly as possible towards 
a full economic union and if that came to nothing, it might as well 
disband. The French delegate, Count de la Beaume expressed the view that 
the Council had achieved nothing other than the fact that committees and 
subcommittees had risen from the ground like toadstools. The Dutch dele­
gation, lacking any instructions, had expressed the expectation that the 
government might be interested if the group were larger (including 
Switzerland, Italy and possibly West Germany) but because there was no
support from Belgium, the Dutch were unable to block a proposal for
128)further study of the possibility of intra-group trade concessions
In cabinet these developments had led to the .decision to accelerate
negotiations on giving substance to the Benelux agreement, but not to
129)countenance ideas to expand it so as to include France . French
pressure continued with the suggestion in March 1946 that a trade-preference
area embracing the Conseil Tripartite partners should form the basis of
a joint initiative at the forthcoming International Conference on Trade
and Employment in Havana. Vos sketched the problem as follows:
whilst the French wanted a preference-area confined to the four, Dutch
interests would be better served by an 'open' agreement. Van Rooyen
felt that agreement to the French proposals would limit the Dutch room
for manoeveur and that, anyway, nothing should be done without an
approach first being made towards the United Kingdom. In the words of
Vos, again, 'trade with France is of small importance compared with that
of the Anglo-Saxon World * . In July, Germany was introduced (again) as
a possible consideration with cabinet concluding 'we must not tie ourselves
to a French economic policy before we have more perspectives (i.e. for
131)trade) over our Eastern border' . The Conseil Tripartite itself 
eventually survived in 1948 when, in view of the many other, and wider, 
discussion forums which had arisen in the meanwhile, it was considered to 
have outlived its usefullness.
Although the French had failed in their attempt to deepen the Conseil 
Tripartite into a more fundamental form of economic cooperation, they 
had not abandoned the Benelux states as potential partners in the area of 
European integration. The occasion for the next initiatieve in this 




























































































between July and September 1947 with Hirschfeld leading the Dutch 
delegation. The first discussions were held informally at the end of 
August with the British, French and Italian delegations, in the course 
of which the French suggested that a limited number of states should 
mutually announce a charter to reduce tariffs on inter-state trade by 10 
percent p.a. To this Hirschfeld responded with two questions (conditions) 
i) were the French willing to accept an ultimate tariff level no higher 
than the Benelux tariff and ii) would they be prepared to accept 
Germany from the start? The meeting was suspended before the answer 
could be given. Hirschfeld's impression was 'France wants to launch 
a customs union but does not want to do this with Italy alone preferring 
a cooperation with Belgium, the Netherlands and Luxembourg. England 
cannot join in but does not want to play the role of spoiler and tries 
to present herself as broker. This situation is not pleasant for us'.
In the subsequent weeks, the French concentrated their pressure on the 
Belgians whilst Hirschfeld negotiated with the British to find a formula 
to neutralise the threat. Nonetheless 'the whole French tactics is geared towards 
obtaining the agreement of Benelux. When the French plan eventually appeared, it was 
fortunately so Franco-centric as to make Hirschfeld's task easier e.g. 
the French government 'declares that it is ready to enter into negotia­
tions with all European governments ... who wish to enter a customs union 
with France and whose national economics are capable of being combined 
with the French economy in such a way as to make a viable unit..'. A
joint. UK-Benelux motion was accepted which had the effect of shunting
1 32)the proposals into an OEEC study group.
Towards the end of 1949, against the background of increasing American 
pressure for a measure of trade liberalisation in Europe, the French 
again launched the idea of regional cooperation with the Benelux partners. 
The French proposals, submitted in November 1949, suggested a payments 
union embracing Benelux, Italy and France (christened Fritalux) which 
incorporated the Petche Plan for flexible enxchange rates . Whilst 
the content of the French proposals found no sympathy at all in cabinet, 
the Dutch were desperate enough for any forum to push for trade libera­
lisation and wary enough of the prospect of life without Marshall Aid, 
to formulate a positive response containing additional/alternative propo­
sals. These centred on a 75 percent liberalisation of trade by December 
1950, a 100 percent liberalisation by July 1951 and the reduction of 




























































































(note, by liberalisation is meant the removal of quantitative trade 
134)restrictions). Finally, German participation was to be agreed from the 
start. I think that it is fair to say that the Dutch had never had any 
intention of agreeing to the French monetary scheme and were highly emba- 
rassed by the French willingness to make concessions. By December the 
French had agreed to the Dutch liberalisation proposals without any 
strings attatched on the question of progress on the monetary fund and 
they were willing to negotiate on tariffs. At the same time the Belgians
dropped their insistance on making German participation a precondition
135) 136)for their own . Later Schumann explained to Stikker that French
public opinion would not accept German participation from the outset but 
asked whether the Dutch would accept a compromise whereby Fritalux were 
set up and the Germans invited later. Stikker rejected this as unaccep­
table arguing that if Germany joined late, it would need so many special
exemptions which would lead in turn to .such pressure for counter-concessions
137)that Germany might not be able to accept
The dilemmas posed by the isolation of the Dutch negotiating position 
was resolved by the OEEC acceptance of the Bissel Plan for a European 
Payments Union (see p, 46) which rendered the French monetary scheme 
redundant. Spierenberg, the chief Dutch negotiator, argued that the only 
justification for a limited grouping (now, symbolically renamed Finebel) 
was that if it could, within a short period, achieve spectacular results 
in the freeing of trade, which could not be achieved within the OEEC.
What he had in mind was a free-trade area - though given the French and
1 O O ' )
Italian standpoints on tariffs he was pessimistic about success 
In order to avoid the 'German' question he suggested that the Finebel 
convention should be an 'open' one which would allow Germany, and possibly 
the U.K. to join, and which would not create the impression in the 
OEEC forum that the Netherlands had abandoned their wider interests
for a narrow regional grouping 
140)cabinet
139) This new position was accepted by
When the Finebel negotiations were renewed in February 1950, the 
Dutch were again isolated on the German question when Belgium dropped 
the issue and declared a willingness to join a 'closed' Finebel trade 
group. By way of concession, which the French accepted (.'), the Belgians 
suggested that Germany be invited to join if the British raised no 




























































































. . . 1 4 1 )the 'cost' of German participation . Although Stikker's soundings with
the British and Americans had been positive, cabinet had become disillusioned
over whether Finebel could fulfil its 'leadership' role within the OEEC
in obtaining major trade concessions. The annual round of trade negotiations
with both France and Italy were running into difficulties. The French,
Stikker reported, were not conducting their negotiations 'in the spirit of
Finebel' and the Italians did not appear 'very Finebel inclined' either.
Spierenberg, moreover, doubted the sincerity of the French regarding German
participation and without Germany, Van den Brink and Mansholt considered
142)that Finebel was not a viable form of cooperation . With that, Dutch 
attention shifted back towards the larger forum of the OEEC as a platform 
for their aims (see pp. 46-48).
The hardened American line towards European cooperation towards the end
of 1949 brought another, less expected, suitor to the Dutch door. In
December 1949 the British suggested that the Netherlands might wish to
join the sterling area. 'It was suggested namely in an, in our opinion,
very innocent way that Dutch trade could take part in the sterling commerce
on the same foot as the English but also that all transactions made in
the course of Dutch trade be conducted entirely in sterling ... Over this
English vision, we expressed ourselves highly astonished' reported
Teppema who was heading the Dutch delegation at the annual round of
143) . . .trade negotiations . At first sight the British proposal was not so 
surprising. Since the War Britain had become an increasingly important 
supplier of Dutch imports and although its share in Dutch exports was still 
below the level of 1938, the trend was upwards. Moreover in 1948 the 
Netherlands had been granted a so-called 'green light' arrangement on 
exports to the rest of the sterling area (removing many irksome.formalities) 
and accepted sterling as payment of balances in its sterling trade, 
placing it de facto in the 'outer sterling area'. However, from the 
Dutch side, economic relations with the United Kingdom had been far from 
satisfactory. In the first place it was felt that the British had abused 
their monopsonistic power on World markets when it came to setting the 
price for its agricultural imports and, moreover, that they had taken 
advantage of the Dutch 'structural' surplusses in market garden produce 
(because of the low level of German trade) to 'force' the Dutch to 
expand meat and dairy exports at the same artificially low prices. Indeed 




























































































policy rests upon the willingness of England (to supply the necessary
144)credit)' . The fact that the following year, the British agreed to a
lump-sum sterling payment towards the cost of Dutch export subsidies
145)needed on the agreed quota did nothing to quell this sense of 
grievance. A further cause for concern was that although the U.K. market 
was increasing in importance, this was largely achieved by the agricul­
tural sector. The Dutch were often unable to fulfill their industrial 
quotas because of the often arbitrary and unexplained refusal of British 
officials to grant import licences and because Dutch imports attracted 
purchase tax which made it difficult to compete against 'utility goods' 
By 1949 a further problem had arisen that Dutch trade with the U.K. had 
swung into surplus and this, combined with the surplusses elsewhere in 
the sterling area, meant that the Netherlands were accumulating non- 
convertible sterling assets at a rate likely to exceed its spending 
capacity. Moreover, the sudden opening, of the German market meant that
there was no longer the same need to unload agrarian surplusses onto
147)the U.K. market (at U.K. conditions and prices). Thus the Dutch
had entered into the 1949 negotiations in a more aggressive mood than 
at any time since the War. It was not exactly the best moment for the 
British to launch their initiative. The Dutch were aiming to deflect 
trade away from the sterling area; they were hardly likely to be recep­
tive to measures which would have the opposite effect. In particular it 
was felt that the move would damage the opportunity to revive the 
transit trade:'This traditional trade which forms an important balan­
cing item for the Netherlands in its balance of payments with many 
other countries can only develop, as far as sterling products are 
concerned, if sterling can be converted into third currencies. Moreover 
many countries do not possess the necessary sterling balances to be able 
to make their payments in sterling, whilst, traditionally, a large
share of this trade was conducted in guilders' . Cabinet endorsed
149)the rejection of the offer with no qualms whatever
The background to the Fritalux and sterling-area initiatives was the 
speech made by Hoffmann to the OEEC that the continued availability of 
Marshall Aid funds was contingent upon progress towards freeing intra- 
European trade. The Dutch position in considering initiaitves to this 
end lay in the distinction made between quantitative restrictions to 
trade and tariff barriers. The relative rate at which these were 




























































































current account deficit, the Netherlands was nonetheless saddled with 
the relatively low Benelux tariff which had come into operation in 
January 1948. Its only remaining line of defence lay in its freedom 
in imposing quantitative trade restrictions. If this freedom to be eroded 
whilst other countries retained the freedom to replace their quotas with 
prohibitive tariff barriers, the Dutch external position could only be 
expected to deteriorate even further. Hence it became a major policy 
priority to try to link the two issues as far as possible together.
There was, however, one major logistical flaw in this - tariff negotia­
tions were the preserve of G.A.T.T. If the OEEC were not to end up dupli­
cating the work of the GATT conference at Torquay, it would have to 
look for progress elsewhere - in the field of quantitative trade res­
trictions.
The first initiative had come from the British in November 1949 proposing 
a 40 percent liberalisation. Stikker had countered with a suggestion for 
60 percent which was adopted as the OEEC target for July 1950. The 
figure, 60 percent, had been a shot in the dark and there was considerable 
disquiet in cabinet over the advisability of a move which seemed certain 
to weaken the balance of payments at a moment when no agreement had been 
reached on the nature of the multilateral settlements system which was 
supposed to accompany it nor the amount of dollars the Americans 
were prepared to put into it. Nonetheless, as Stikker pointed out, without 
liberalisation, Marshall Aid itself was at stake and the Netherlands had 
even less to gain from that.'"^ In January agreement had been reached 
in principle to establish the European Payments Union (henceforth 
EPU) but, as the Dutch negotiations pointed out 'the multilateral 
system will only remove rectrictions on European commerce insofar as 
these restrictions are a result of payments difficulties. Those restric­
tions which are the result of protectionist measures of whatever nature 
are not abolished with this system'. They suggested that the Dutch should 
countinue to press for the further freeing of trade and on the tariffs 
question but not to make participation in the EPU conditional on the 
outcome. This was initially a c c e p t e d b u t  later in the month the 
Dutch position hardened. It was decided to liberalise trade by 60 percent 
by July 1950 but not to proceed to the next step of 75 percent liberalisa­
tion by December, unless progress were made on the question of tariffs.
As Manholt pointed out, the French practice of replacing quotas with 




























































































The opportunity for the Dutch to steer the OEEC negotiations in the
direction they wanted was afforded by the nomination of Stikker as
consiliateur politique on January 30 when the OEEC negotiations had
reached dead-lock, and, several months later when he became Chairman
of the Council. Before this could lead to anything, however, the Dutch
had to formulate their position on participation in July. This they did
in two ways. In the first place it was agreed to press for a strenghtening
of the Fund itself so that it was still capable of funding possible gold
and dollar losses once Marshall Aid had ceased. Secondly, in order to cover
against the possibility of an exhaustion of drawing rights, the government
153)would limit its committment to one year . This dual construction with 
its emphasis on the one hand on the permanence of the new arrangements 
and on the other on the transience of Dutch committment to them was not
15without a certain ambiguity and the delegates asked for new instructions 
This brought the cabinet back to its original position -payments liberali­
sation must be seen as a complement to trade liberalisation and the 
Dutch could not agree to the one without the other
The Stikker Plan presented to the OEEC in June 1950 was simply a direct 
extension of Dutch foreign policy aims throughout the OEEC negotiations.
It also appeared to have every chance of success since the Schuman Plan 
was, in fact, a partial expression of exactly what Stikker had in mind.
The Plan, basically, suggested that the opportunities for tariff reduction 
be examined sector by sector with the costs of any serious structural 
dislocation which might result being met from a European Integration Fund. 
There was only one problem - the Plan could not deliver short-term results.
The immediate way forward, it was decided, was to push for a freeze on
all the higher tariffs coupled with a lowering of the general tariff 
156)level . When this failed there was a change in tack and the negotia­
tions were instructed to call for an abolition of 'state trade'. 'State 
trade' had hitherto been excluded from the calculation of liberalisation 
percentages and the effect of its abolition would be that countries with 
a large 'state trade' sector would have to free a larger proportion of 
their trade than had been originally forseen (naturally, the Dutch had 
only a relatively small 'state trade' sector). This had no chance of
success and time had run out. With no concessions at all on the tariff 
front and with a level of dollar aid which was disappointing, cabinet had 
to make a decision on EPU membership. The chief negotiator, Spierenberg, 




























































































would also jeopardize progress towards the Benelux union but he suggested, 
in calculating the liberalisation figure, the Dutch should now include 
the much higher percentage figure achieved in intra-Benelux trade the
result of which, as Van den Brink was quick to pick up, was that no
158)further liberalisation would be required!
Notwithstanding the sleight-of-hand 'no liberalisation' policy with which 
the Netherlands had entered the EPU the Dutch position lurched quickly 
and alarmingly into deficit (see Figure Two). Although there were clear 
signs of progress on the Schuman Plan and although the Stikker Plan was 
being examined by the OEEC sector committees (namely Textiles and Pulp 
and Paper) signs of concrete progress on tariff reductions were as remote 
as ever. Yet the next step envisaged the attainment of 75 percent libera­
lisation by December 1950. It was agreed in cabinet that the negotiators 
should continue £o press for concession on the tariff and state trade 
issues. In addition a new issue was to be raised; namely that the base 
year for the German liberalisation calculations should be altered from 
1948 (which gave the Dutch little by way of extra concessions) to 1950.
Finally, it was agreed that the Netherlands should reserve its rights not
159)to proceed towards further liberalisation . Almost immediately the Dutch 
found themselves completely i s o l a t e d b u t  eventually its position was 
grudgingly acknowledged. In the words of the Dutch negotiator 'If the 
results of this Council session are highly satisfactory for the Nether­
lands, it was certainly not a Council session in which European coope­
ration in the economic area could book an important a d v a n c e ' I n  
January 1951 a trade agreement was reached with Germany sufficient to
163)allow to drop their reserves on the question of further liberalisation 
which, by them, had been delayed until July 1951. The same month cabinet 
completed deliberations on the deflationary package designed to tackle 
the balance-of-payments problem (see pp. 22-23). Insofar as that problem 
was itself a result of the inflationary implications of reconstruction 
policy. I suppose a link could be drawn with the attitude towards foreign 
policy but the actual form that policy was to take was determined far 
more by the Benelux tariff agreement which removed Dutch freedom of 
action in this area and which, in turn, led to demands that other countries 
should sacrafice that freedom too. Success in this direction was achieved 
in only one area but nonetheless that one achievement was to mark the 




















































































































































































































































































































































































The Schuman Plan, as a general concept, was welcomed by the Dutch for 
fairly obvious reasons - it represented a break-through on the front 
of both non-quantitative and quantitative restrictions to trade, 
it fitted in with the sector-by-sector approach outlined by Stikker and, 
finally, it included German participation from the outset. Right from the 
start, however, it was clear that cabinet had important reservations, 
the greatest of which was the need to place some control over the inde­
pendence of the High Authority. 'Leaving all decisions to the High 
Authority seems a dangerous step which moreover has the danger for the 
Netherlands that, as a small country, it can become the victim of an 
international power struggle' (Lieftinck). It is also interesting that 
whilst British participation was considered desirable, the Plan was163)
considered viable without her . After the first international 
contacts, cabinet met again to clarify its position. Once more the inde­
pendent role of the High Authority appeared the 'stumbling block. As things 
stood, Van den Brink considered the Plan 'amounts to the establishment 
of a European government for only one specific economic and social 
sector which, from a general standpoint, implies a disintegration of 
Europe'. Drees went even further, stating that as it stood the Plan 
seemed to hold more disadvantages than advantages for the Netherlands 
and that whilst he hoped for success, he was not prepared to make every 
sacrafice to realise it; national governments had maintain some control.
A Council of Ministers, possibly in conjunction with a European parlia­
ment, became a precondition of Dutch a c c e p t a n c e . More generally it 
was decided that Dutch interests would be best served by the lowest 
possible price level coupled with low tariffs. This strategy was argued 
on the grounds of the need to promote efficiency by concentrating industry 
in the most rational manner**“̂  but equally it served to maximise Dutch 
benefits i) because the Netherlands was a net importer of iron and 
steel products and ii) because both its small iron and steel sector 
and its coal industry were relatively efficient. In July, Monnet outlined 
the logic behind the French ideas for the autonomy of the High Authority 
- i) that inter-governmental negotiations were too inefficient to solve 
Europe's problems ii) that the Americans wanted progress towards inte­
gration and iii) that what was wanted, therefore, was an 'organe de 




























































































The Dutch, backed by the Belgians, remained totally unmoved 
Within cabinet, two weeks later, it was decided to accept a French 
compromise proposal for a High Authority, with its independent powers 
more proscribed than originally envisaged, operating under the super­
vision and guidelines (but not control) of a Council of M i n i s t e r s .
With the major obstacle to Dutch participation thus removed, the remaining
negotiations involved obtaining the best possible construction for Dutch
national interests. This involved the settlement of two points i) that
the external tariff should be both low and fixed (this, against the
suggestion of working with maximum and minimum tariffs) and ii) that
the idea that the High Authority should have powers of control over
government investments should be modified - all or nothing. The logic
behind this was that it would lay Dutch Hoogovens and Staatsmijnen open
to control whilst the Belgian industry, financed through the Société
16 ft')Générale, would escape altogether . Since both of these problems 
were satisfactory resolved and no insoluble other issues cropped up in 
the meantime, cabinet was able to approve the final draft of the treaty 




As I tried to warn in the introduction, this paper has failed to esta­
blish any link between domestic reconstruction policy and foreign econo­
mic policy. It also failed to establish any link between domestic recon­
struction policy and any change in the structure of the Dutch economy, 
sufficiently large to effect the country's foreign economic orientation, 
occurring within the time-span covered by the paper. This is not to say 
that the domestic and foreign sectors of the economy did not inter-relate 
but, if anything, the causal flow of that relationship was the opposite 
of that which we have examined. Had this paper been entitled something 
like 'International Developments and Dutch Domestic Economic Reconstruc­
tion' the story would have been a much more cohesive one. However, it was not 
the story which I was asked to write.
The question which I would like to pose in this section is: why was there 
apparently so little connection between reconstruction policy and foreign 




























































































that the Netherlands did not have a reconstruction policy at all in the 
sense of being able to direct the desired changes in the structure of the 
economy as a whole. Vos, whose ambitions certainly aspired in this di­
rection was squeezed out of the Ministry of Economic Affairs after a 
year, a year, moreover, which was dominated by the immediate concerns 
of recovery and which left little scope for implementing more far-reaching 
policies. His successors Huysmans and Van den Brink, whilst sharing the 
realisation that the Netherlands required a restructuring/industrialisa- 
tion policy, were far more inclined to confine the role of the state to 
infrastructural improvement and financial and fiscal encouragement to the 
private sector. Again, at the level of policy, it was equally true that 
the Netherlands had great difficulties in making 'international consequen­
ces' happen in any positive sense or even of avoiding less eagerly anti­
cipated 'consequences' in the negative sense. The first sense is well 
illustrated by reference to its policy towards the reintegration of 
Germany into the world economy and tariff reduction, the second by refe­
rence to the way it was almost forced into giving practical expression to 
Benelux and into joining the EPU. Thus in the domestic policy area we are 
confronted with the abdication of power whilst in foreign economic policy 
we are confronted with the impotence in the exercise of power.
There is also a deeper factor which might have contributed to the schism 
between domestic and foreign policy which lies in the nature of the 
policy-making process itself and which goes beyond the oft-cited problem 
of individual ministerial accountability in coalition governments. 
'Reconstruction policy' was not centred in an individual ministry - 
Economic Affairs had the industrial chunk and, after June 1946, electricity 
as well; Agriculture, Fisheries and Food looked after agriculture; Public 
Works and Reconstruction had the responsibility for drawing up the annual 
building programmes (including industrial and agricultural plant), Trans­
port, not surprisingly, looked after transport. In addition, the Ministry 
of Finance controlled the foreign exchange flow and Social Affairs was 
responsible for wage policy. In the area of foreign economic policy a 
similar situation prevalied though from a rather different starting point. 
In the 1930's Hirschfeld had built up a powerful organisation within the 
Economic Affairs Ministry and had succeeded in capturing the major res­
ponsibility for the direction of foreign economic policy for the Trade 
and Industry section he controlled. Immediately after the War the respon­




























































































two separate sections. There were plans later to reunite the functions 
in a single department but since these had originated from Vos' socia- 
list/state interventionist appointees. Huysmans chose to ignore them. In 
addition to the 'foreign economic affairs' section within Economic Affairs, 
the Ministry of Finance held the responsibility for negotiating foreign 
credits and, when Marshall Aid was announced, the Ministry of Foreign 
Affairs managed, at last, to get back into the act (a feat helped by 
recruiting the ever resourceful and appently untiring Hirschfeld to its 
staff) by taking charge of the Marshall Aid question and all the OEEC 
developments which flowed from it - almost all, anyway, since the Ministry 
of Economic Affairs took over the Schuman Plan negotiations. With that 
set-up the author was only grateful that he could find anything identify- 





























































































APPENDIX THE COMPOSITION OF POST-WAR CABINETS
In parentheses: the footnote number g iv in g  a short b iographical sketch
June 19A5 -  July 1946 July 1946 - August 1948 August 1948 -  March 195lj
M inister President W. Schermerhom (120) L.J.M. Beel W. Drees (101)
Finance P. L ieftin ck  (24) P. Lieftinck (24) P. Lieftinck (24)
1 )Economic A ffair* H. Vos (38) G.W.H. Huijsmans (39) 
(from Jan.*48)J.R.H. van den Brink (3<
J.R.M. van den Brink 
)  <34>
Foreign A ffa irs E.N. K ieffens (92) 
(from M ar.'46)J.H. van Roijen (118)
C.A.W.H. baron van Boet2 
Van Oosterhout
elaar D.U. Stikker (137)
Social A ffa irs W. Drees (101) W. Drees (101) A.M. Joekes
A g r ic ., F ish , and Food S.L. Mansholt (A3)
i
S.L. Mansholt (43) S.L. Mansholt (43)





(from Nov.*46)H. Vos (38) 
(from Feb.'47)L. Neher 
(from Mar.*48)J. in *t Veld
J. in *t Veld
1
Transport1 23^ T.S.G.J.M. van Schaik H. Vos (38) J.R.H. van Schaik 
(from Nov.'48)D.G.W. Spitzen
Internal A ffa irs L .J. M. Beel L.J.M. Beel
(from Sept.*47)P.J. Witteman
J.H. van Maarseveen 
(from Jun.*49)J.R.H. van Schaik ' 
(from Sept. *49)F.G.C. J.M. Teulings j
Colonies
1t
J.H.A. Logemann J.A. Jonkman E.M.J.A. Sassen 1





J. Meynen A.H.J.L. Fievez W.F. Schokking 




J.M. de Booy A.H.J.L. Fievez





(from Oct.'50)H.J. *s Jacobs
i
i
Education G. van der Leeuv J. Gielen F.J.Th. Rut ten
i
' J u stice
i
!
H.A.M.T. Kolfschoten J.H. van Maarseveen T.R.J. Wijers
(from May'50) J.H. van Maarsseveen
i
Without p o r tfo lio J.H. van Roijen (118) 
(from Mar*46) E.N. Kleffens (92)
E.N. Kleffens (92) 
(from Nov.*47)L. Gotzen
J.R.H. van Schaik 
L. Gotzen
1) Before July 1946 known as Trade and Industry.
2) After August 1947 known as Reconstruction and Housing.
3) June 1945 -  July 1946 known as Transport and Energy. In July 1946 responsibility for Energy was transferred to Economic Affairs. 























































































































































































*) This paper is largely the result of archival research undertaken in the 
period May-September 1983 and was only made possible in the relatively 
short time available by the exceptional help and cooperation which I 
received from the staff in change of the archives used. I would like to 
take this opportunity of recording my heart-felt thanks to all concerned 
and in particular to messers Plantinga (Algemeen Rijksarchief) De Gee 
and Dekker (Ministerie van Economische Zaken) Gloude and Stegenga (Minis- 
terie van Financien) van Dissel, Haberts, Vogelzang and Mrs.Robinson 
(Ministerie van Algemene Zaken). I would also like to record a special 
word of thanks to my research assistant Anjo G. Harryvan for his efforts 
on my behalf which can truthfully be characterized as 'over and beyond 
the call of duty'.
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Minister for Trade and Industry and in the second, the cabinet Beel, he 
became Minister for Transport and Waterworks. After his ministerial 
posts, he became director of the Centrale Arbeiders Vurzekeringsbank 
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politics in 1956 as member of the First Chamber.
39. Gerardus Wilhelmus Maria Huysmans (1902-1948). Before the war, he built 
up a career in banking culminating in the directorship of the Coope- 
ratieve Centrale Boerenleenbank in 1932. Member of the Katholieke 
Volkspartij. Towards the end of the War he formed part of a group in the 
occuppied Netherlands which opened contacts with London, and, as such, 
was requested to act as Minister of Finance in the last war-time cabi­
net. In October 1945 he was nominated president of the government- 
backed Herstelbank. In July 1946 he became Minister of Economic Affairs 





























































































40. See L. de Liagre Bohl, Nederland industrialiseert! and P.E. de Hen,
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43. Sicco L. Mansholt (1908- ) After a career in agriculture and a period
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rejected there was a mad scramble to inventorise all existing capital 
projects which eventually formed the basis for Interbank Nota I submitted 
in April 1947. There was then a further delay since the application had 
failed to mention the projects to be financed by the loan itself so it 
was not until August 1947 that the $ 195 million loan agreement was signed 
- virtually three months to the day after the French had succeeded in 
securing their $ 250 million loan (For documantation on the loan appli­
cation see Min. Fin., Generale Thesaurie, 382/135).
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54. Min. EZ, DG Industrialisatie, 96/2, Voorbereidend advies inzake het 
Centraal Economisch Plan 1948. Eerste Nota, CPB, October 1947.
55. Hans Max Hirschfeld (1899-1961). Almost unknown in 1931, he was appoin­
ted Director-General of the Ministry of Trade and Industry which he helped 
build up into a powerful organisation. Despite some Jewish ancestry
he stayed on at him post throughout the War and, as such, represented 
the top of Dutch civil administration. Immediately after the War he 
slipped into temporary political exile but in 1947 was recalled to ful­
fil the function of Regeringscommissaris in algemene dienst. As such 
he played a major role in the early OEEC and ERP negotiations. In 
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92. Eelco Nicolaas van Kleffens (1894-1983). Worked as a civil servant 
at the Ministry of Foreign Affairs between 1922 and 1939. In 1939 
he became Minister of Foreign Affairs in the last pre-war cabinet 
and held the post in the government-in-exile as well as in the first 
post-war cabinet. In March 1946 he became Minister without portfolio 
and, as such, represented the Netherlands at the UN. In 1947 he 
became ambassador in Washington and in 1950 he was transferred to 
Lisbon. His further diplomatic career included spells with NATO and 
the OEEC (1956-58) and the ECSC (1958-1967).
93. A.R.A., MR (388) 25.9.1945.
94. The Ministerial meeting was held on 28.9.1945 but the minutes are missing 
from files. I assume the plan was defeated since nothing more was
heard of it.
95. Min. AZ, Kabinet, 35 1.88(43) :341.22 1 . Report of the Commissie ter 
bestudering van het annexatievraagstuk d.d. 7.5.1946.
96. A.R.A., MR (388) 27.5.1946.
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Soviet Republieken, het Vereenigde Koninkrijk en de Vereenigde Staten 
van Amerika, betreffende de Nederlandsche territoriale en economische 
eisen ten aanzien van Duitschland d.d. 5.11.1946.
101. Willem Drees (1886- ). Followed a political career as member of the
SDAP (see fn. 38) in various tiers of local government until in 1933
he became member of the Second Chamber. In 1940 he became leader of the 
parliamentary faction. During the War he was imprisoned in St. Michiels- 
gesteld and later in Buchenwald. Between 1945 and 1948 he was Minister 
of Social Affairs and then Minister-President, a position he held in 
various cabinets until 1958. Thereafter he became Minister of State. He 
remained active in the socialist party until 1971 when he resigned from 
the P.v.d.A since he could no longer support its policies.
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103. A.R.A., MR (391) 5.7.1948.
104. Min. AZ, Kabinet, 351.88(43):341.22 Report of the Working Party on the 
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105. Min. AZ, Kabinet, 351.88(44+493):33 Perde vergadering van den Conseil 
Tripartite (no date - the Council met in full session on 18 and 19 
September 1945).
106. A.R.A., REA (570) 8.10.1945, 22.10.1945.





























































































108. Min. AZ, Kabinet, 351.88(43):33 Memorandum betreffende de economische 
verhouding tussen Nederland en Duitsland d.d. 5.2.1946. This was 
already well known but it obviously did not harm to remind oneself 
now and then.
109. Min. AZ, Kabinet, 351.88(43):33 Het economische verkeer met Duitsland 
d.d. 28.3.1946.
110. Min. AZ, Kabinet, 351.88(43):33 Letter Teppema to Huijsmans d.d.
22.8.1946.
111. Min. AZ, Kabinet, 351.88(43):33 The Netherlands' General Attitude 
to Trade with Germany d.d. 13.9.1946. Proposal for a Central Body 
for Trade with Germany d.d. 16.9.1946 (both working papers for the 
negotiations) Onderhandelingen met OMGUS d.d. 23.9.1946.
112. Min. AZ, Kabinet, 351.88(43):33 Verslag der besprekingen met de Britsch- 
Amerikaansche zones van Duitschland, d.d. 1.2. 1947 ,■ Verslag van een 
reis naar Berlijn ter besprekingen van de Nederlandsch-Duitsche 
economische betrekkingen van 25 Februari - 1 Maart 1947 d.d. 10.3.1947.
113. Min. AZ, Kabinet, 351.88(43):33 Note-Teppema to Van den Brink d.d.
5.8.1948.
114. Min. AZ, Kabinet, 351.88(43):33 Besprekingen over het handels- en 
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115. Min. AZ, Kabinet, 351.88(43):33 Handels- en betalingsverkeer met 
West-Duitsland d.d. 7.9.1949.
116. Min. AZ, Kabinet, 351.88(43):33 Nadere besprekingen in Frankfurt 
inzake de uitvoering van het nieuwe handelsaccoord met West-Duits- 
land van 22 t/m 24 Sept. 1949 d.d. 26.9.1949.
117. Nota inzake de deviezenpositie, Bijlagen tot de Handelingen van de 
Tweede Kamer 1947/48, 722 1-2.
118. Jan Herman van Royen (1905- ). Became a career diplomat in 1930.
During the War he was imprisoned on a number of occasions but eventually 
escaped to London. Immediately after the War he became Minister without 
portfolio in the first post-wat cabinet, in charge of Dutch represen­
tation at the UN,In March 1946 became Minister of Foreign Affairs.
In 1947 he resumed his diplomatic career acting as ambassador, 
successively, in Ottowa (1947-1950), Washington (1950-1964) and London 
(1964-1970). Between 1949 and 1962 he also acted as the head of the 
Dutch delegation in negotiations with Indonesia.
119. Willem Schermerhorn (1894-1977). From 1926 he was a professor at the 
Technical Highschool in Delft. He was also a member of the Liberale 
Staatspartij and later the liberal Vrijzinnig Democratische Bond.
During the War he was held prisoner at St. Michielsgestel. Immediately 
after the War he was one of the joint founders of the NVB but later 
joined the socialist PvdA (see note 24). He became the Minister- 
President of the first post-war Dutch cabinet. In 1948 he was elected 
member to the Second Chamber for the PvdA and between 1951 and 1965 
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123. A.R.A., REA (571) 25.8.1948.
124. A.R.A., REA (571) 23.2.1949.
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126. Min. AZ., 351.88(43):33 Letter Van Kleffens to Schermerhorn d.d.
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127. A.R.A., Kabinet (52) 351.88(44+493):33 Eerste vergadering van de 
Conseil de Cooperation Economique, d.d. 28.5.1945.
128. Min. AZ, Kabinet, 351.88(44+493): 33 Vergadering Conseil Tripartite 
van 29/31 Januari 1946. Teleurstelling over verloop Conseil (no 
date). It is unlikely that the Dutch would have agreed to an expres­
sion which included Italy and Switzerland alone. In his first report 
the chief Dutch delegate, Lamping, had commented that a Southwards 
expansion of the group would leave the Netherlands as a 'Northern 
Outpost'. What he preferred was a possible involvement of Scandinavia 
(see note 127).
129. A.R.A., REA (570) 21.1.1946.
130. A.R.A., REA (570) 12.3.1946.
131. A.R.A., REA (570) 16.7.1946. See also meetings 28.8.1946 and 3.9.1946 
which both reaffirmed the Netherlands' unwillingness to countenance a 
customs union with France and Benelux alone.
132. A.R.A., Kabinet (111) 351.88(73):33(1) Besprekingen met de Engelsen, 
Fransen en Italianen op 26 Augustus over het tolunie-vraagstuk d.d. 
27.8.1947. Besprekingen met Sir Oliver Franks en Sir Edmund Hall 
Patch op 31 Augustus 1947 d.d. 1.9.1947. Letter Hirschfeld to Stikker 
d.d. 14.9.1947, Note: Parijs conferentie 15 t/m 20 September.
133. A.R.A., Min. EZ, B.E.B. (403) Memorandum, Ministerie Affaires Etrangères 
d.d. 14.11.1949.
134. A.R.A., Min. EZ, B.E.B. (403) Memorandum voor besprekingen welke in 
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also A.R.A., REA (571) 16.11.1949, 23.11.1949.
135. A.R.A., Min. EZ, B.E.B. (403) Verslag van de besprekingen, die te 
Parijs zijn gevoerd op initiatief van de Franse Regering tussen de 
Beneluxlanden, Frankrijk en Italie d.d. 6.12.1949 and 12.12.1949.
136. Dirk Uipho Stikker (1897-1979) followed a career in various banks 
until 1935 when he became Director of Heineken brewery. He remained 
in the Netherlands throughout the War and in 1946 became a liberal 
member in the First Chamber (for the Partij van de Vrijheid which 




























































































Between 1948 and 1952 he held the post of Minister of Foreign Affairs. 
Thereafter he was successively ambassador in London (1952-1958) per­
manent representative in NATO and the OEEC (1958-1961) secretary-general 
of NATO (1961-1966).
137. Min. AZ, Kabinet, 351.88(493.2):33 Note Stikker d.d. 30.12.1949 Foto 20060.
138. A.R.A., MR (583) Nota betreffende multilateraal Europees betalingsstel- 
sel d.d. 4.1.1950.
139. A.R.A., MR (583) Bijeenkomst te Parijs van de Consultative Group en van 
de Council op Ministerieel Niveau van 26 Januari t/m 1 Februari 1950 
d.d. 6.2.1950 (REA 8.2.1950).
140. A.R.A, REA (572) 4.1.1950,8.2.1950.
141. A.R.A., MR (583) Rapport betreffende bespreking Finebel te Parijs op 
9.2,1950 no date (REA 14.2.1950).
142. A.R.A., REA (572) 21.2.1950.
143. Min. AZ, Kabinet, 351.88(42):33 Letter Teppema tb Van den Brink d.d. 
13.12.1949.
144. A.R.A., REA (570) 12.2.1947, 26.2.1947.
145. Min. AZ, Kabinet, 351.88(42):33 Verslag der handelspolitieke besprekin- 
gen tussen Nederlandse en Britse vertegenwoordigers gehouden in Den 
Haag van 5 t/m 11 Februari 1948 d.d. 16.2.1948 and Verslag van de 
besprekingen in Londen inzake het handelsverkeer tussen Nederlatid en het 
Vereenigd Koninkrijk van 25 t/m 27 Februari 1948, d.d. 5.3.1948.
146. Min. AZ, Kabinet, 351.88(42):33 Handelsverkeer met het Verenigd 
Koninkrijk d.d. 21.10.1948.
147. Min. AZ, Kabinet, 351.88(42):33 De komende financiele- en handelsbe- 
sprekingen met het Verenigd Koninkrijk, d.d. 5.12.1949.
148. Min. AZ, Kabinet 351.88(42):33 Note Lieftinck to the Members of REA 
concerning Financiele besprekingen tussen het Ministerie van Finan- 
cien en UK Treasury van 9 en 10 December 1949, d.d. 24.12.1949.
149. A.R.A., REA (571) 27.12.1949.
150. A.R.A., REA (571) 16.11.1949.
151. A.R.A., MR (583) Nota betreffende multilaterale Europees betalings- 
stelsel d.d. 2.1.1950 (REA 4.1.1950).
152. A.R.A., REA (572) 25.1.1950.
153. A.R.A., MR (585) Letter from Prof. F.A.G. Keesing to REA, concerning 
EPU d.d. 21.4.1950 (REA 25.4.1950).





























































































155. A.R.A., REA (572) 17.5.1950j
156. A.R.A., REA (572) 7.6.1950, 13.6.1950.
157. A.R.A., REA (572) 27.6.1950.
158. A.R.A., REA (572) 1.7.1950.
159. A.R.A., REA (572) 3.10.1950.
160. A.R.A., MR (589) Verslag van de Council Vergadering van de OEEC op
6 en 7 October 1950 te Parijs gehouden d.d. 10.10.1950 (RÈA 11.1Ò. I950)
161. A.R.A., MR (590) Verslag van de besprekingen van de Ministeriele 
Council van de OEEC te Parijs, gehouden op 26 en 27 October 1950 
d.d. 31.10.1950 (REA 2.11. 1950) .
162. A.R.A., MR (591) Handelsabkommen zwischen der Rpgierung der Bundes- 
republik Deutschland und der Regierung des Konigreichs der Nieder- 
lande von 18 Januari 1951 (REA 31.1.1951).
163. A.R.A., REA (572) 13.6.1950.
164. A.R.A., REA (572) 1.7.1950.
165. A.R.A., MR (586) Nota inzake het Plan Schuman. no date (REA 1.7.1950). 
Contains the conclusions of the special advisory committee set up by 
cabinet.
166. A.R.A., MR (586) Kort verslag van de eerste vergadering van de werk- 
groep institutionele vraagstukken op 5 juli 11 uur. Quai d'Orsav d.d. 
6.7.1950 (REA 18.7.1950).
167. A.R.A., REA (572) 18.7.1950.























































































































































































This paper is based largely on research into Dutch central government 
archives but owing to the pressure of time, the range of sources con­
sulted has been than less than could ideally have been desired. Below 
an attempt has been made to explain the strategy followed and to des­
cribe the nature of the sources themselves. After each description is 
given full details necessary to locate the sources and the abbreviation 
employed in the text.
The level of policy with which this paper was primarily concerned was 
that formulated by cabinet. The minutes of the meetings of the full 
cabinet are deposited in chronological order in the Algemene Rijksarchief
Algemene Rijksarchief, Notulen van de Ministerraad (Ministerraad box 
number) date (ARA, MR (box no), date)
The full cabinet, however, rarely concerned itself with purely economic 
matters unless they had a clearly political dimension (e.g. the German 
annexation question). The day-to-day discussions on economic topics de­
volved to a cabinet sub-committee, the Council for Economic Affairs, 
whose membership included only the ministers most directly concerned and, 
on an ad hoc basis, top cicil servants, the President of the Netherlands 
Bank and the Director of the Central Planning Bureau. These too are 
in chronological order in the Algemene Rijksarchief.
Algemene Rijksarchief, Notulen van de Raad voor Economische 
Aangelegenheden (Ministerraad box number) date 
(ARA, REA (box number) date)
To keep matters simple in the text I have imployed the term 'cabinet' 
both for the full cabinet and the economic subcommittee.
In addition to the cabinet minutes, the discussion papers were also con­
sulted: firstly in their function as background papers to the cabinet 
discussions themselves and secondly because, on the many occasions when 
cabinet could agree, without discussion, to the recommendations they 
are the only source of information on the policy decisions actually taken 
For the period after January 1950, they are relatively easy to locate, 





























































































Algemene Rijksarchief, Ministerraad, Box number, Description of 
document, date of document, date of the Ministerraad or Raad voor 
Econ. Aangelegenheden meeting in which it is located.
(ARA, MR (box no) Description of document, date (MR or REA date)).
Before January 1950 the discussion documents (and others not discussed 
in cabinet) are collected in the 'cabinet' archive of the Ministry of 
General Affairs - a ministerial post held automatically by the Prime- 
Minister. This archive is arranged thematically, each theme with its 
own code number, and within each theme the order is chronological. The 
bulk of these documents are still in the archive of the Ministry itself.
Ministerie van Algemene Zaken, Kabinetsarchief van de Minister-
President, code number, Description of document, date
(Min. AZ, Kabinet, Code number, Description of document, date)
Some parts of the 'cabinet' archive, however, have been transferred to 
the Algemene Rijksarchief. This includes all the documentation of the 
War-time cabinets and, most important from our point of view, the theme 
dealing with the European Recovery Programme. The system is exactly the 
same as that described above with the added stipulation that you need 
to know the box number to locate the document.
Algemene Rijksarchief, Kabinet van de Minister-President (box 
number) Code number, Description of document, date 
(ARA, Kabinet (box number) Code number, Description of document, 
date)
In addition, to clarify certain points or to trace documents which 
proved exceptionally illusive, use was made of the archives of the 
Ministries themselves. The archives of the Ministry of Economic Affairs 
are arranged by Department. Within each departmental archive groups of 
documents can be located by their archive number which seem to have been 
allocated in with no rhyme or reason. Within each file represented by an 
archive number, the order is chronological. The archives consulted at the 
Ministry itself were those of the Directorate-General for Industrialisa­
tion and the Directorate General for Trade arid Industry (handel en nijver- 
heid),
Ministerie van Economische Zaken, D.G., Industrialisatie, Archive 
number, Description of document, date





























































































Ministerie van Economische Zaken, D.G., Handel en Nijverheid,
Archive number, Description of document, date
(Min. EZ, DG Handel en Nijverheid, Archive number, Description of 
document, date)
That section of the Ministry of Economic Affaris archives dealing with 
foreign economic affairs (buitenlandse economische betrekkingen) has 
been transferred to the Algemene Rijksarchief. In this case the Algemene 
Rijksarchief box number has been used,
Algemene Rijksarchief, Ministerie van Economische Zaken, Buiten­
landse Economische Betrekkingen, box number, Description of document, 
date
(ARA, Min. EZ, BEB, (box no.) Description of document, date)
Also under the administration of the Ministry of. Economic Affairs is the 
archive of the Central Bureau of Statistics. This archive is broken 
down thematically with a number (E8 is national accounts) and individual 
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